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The Road to Integration among Arab Countries: Assessing the Political and 
Economic Barriers and Possibilities 
By Amr ElAlfy 
 
Arab countries attempts at regional integration started in the 1950s, but the goal of 
integration has produced very little substantive political or economic results. This lack of 
progress has blocked Arab countries from attaining benefits to their political and 
economic welfare that could accrue as a result. Arab Petro-states are reluctant to share the 
oil returns with other non-oil exporting countries, which have been struggling to develop 
their trade relations. Arab countries have not been able to develop their comparative 
advantages in trade due to historical problems, such as colonialism. Arab countries are 
also lacking effective supranational institutions that can balance the economic gains of 
integration among member states. This research outlines an implementation path that 
would ensure a realistic integration and application based on an assessment of past and 
current integration attempts with a special focus on the Greater Arab Free Trade Area 
(GAFTA), which is an Arab agreement that was signed in 1997. The assessment will 
determine the obstacles that have stinted past integration and how they relate to the status 
of integration in the Arab countries today. Unless Arab states have state-centric 
agreements, which share a common vision of developing industrial and agricultural bases 
that aims at developing states’ dynamic comparative advantages, the total intra-trade 
impact on Arab countries will be slightly positive or even negative since integration will 
result in trade diversion. Arab states can accept short-term losses that can result from 
trade diversion or loss of tariff revenues on condition that their comparative advantages 
can be developed on the long term. Finally, this thesis highlights the economic and non-
economic benefits and obstacles of integration using statistical analyses that simulate the 
economic benefits of Arab intra-regional cooperation.  
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1.Chapter One: Introduction 
Even though Arab countries attempts at regional integration started in the 1950s, 
the goal of Arab integration has produced very little substantive political or economic 
results. This lack of progress has blocked Arab countries from attaining benefits to their 
political and economic welfare that could accrue as a result. Rich oil-exporting Arab
1
 
countries are reluctant to share the oil returns with other non oil-oil exporting states. Arab 
intra-trade is very low when compared to other regions, such as the European Union 
(EU), because Arab countries are often competing on the same markets due to significant 
similarities in their dominant production lines. Arab countries also lack effective 
supranational institutions that can balance the economic gains among member states. This 
research outlines an implementation path that would ensure more realistic integration and 
application than previous attempts based on an assessment of past and current integration 
attempts. The assessment will determine the obstacles that have stunted past integration 
and how they relate to the status of integration in the Arab countries today. It will also 
highlight the economic and non-economic benefits of integration (both political and 
social) using statistical analyses that simulate the economic benefits of Arab intra-
                                                          
1The rich oil exporting countries are the 9 large members of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OAPEC), namely Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Iraq, Libya, Algeria, Qatar, 
Oman, and Bahrain. All these countries except Oman and Bahrain are also members of the Organization of 




regional cooperation with a special focus on the Greater Arab Free Trade Area 
(GAFTA)
2
, which is a regional integration agreement that was signed in 1997.  
Many theories have discussed regionalism and integration. There are two main 
classification approaches of integration theories, namely the economic approach, which is 
mainly concerned with assessing the economic gains of regional integration, and the 
political science approach that is concerned with governance of integration agreements. 
In the political science approach, I will emphasize on the theories of: functionalism, 
neofunctionalism, intergovernmentalism, and neoliberal institutionalism. Functionalism 
is a theory of international relations that views integration as an inevitable process 
between states, because it serves their “functional” interest mainly through technological 
and economic development. Functionalists argue that integration in one sector, for 
example the technological sector, will lead to a “spillover effect” across all other sectors 
as a result of integration, thus achieving better integration results (Mitrany, 1966).  
Neofunctionalists, on the other hand, argue that the “spillover effect” must be derived by 
political leaders and economic elites since spillovers will not be achieved inevitably 
(Haas, 1958). Intergovernmentalism, unlike functionalism and neofunctionalism, views 
integration as a state-driven process, where national governments are responsible for 
planning and developing their economies through effective utilization of state resources 
(Moravcsik, 1991).  
                                                          
2
The GAFTA member countries are: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, 
Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. 
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Neoliberal institutionalism emphasizes that the state serves as both the agent and 
structure of integration agreements, where states are the agents responsible for the 
negotiation and implementation of integration agreements. States are also responsible for 
providing the needed structural frameworks, for example providing the needed 
supranational institutions. Some politicians and political science scholars evaluate the 
success of an integration agreement by comparing the agreement’s stated goals to its 
actual results. Having effectual supranational institutions that can direct member states to 
the effective implementation of agreements rules is a condition for achieving effective 
integration agreements (Mattli, 1999). 
Before discussing Arab regional integration, it is worth mentioning that the 
European Union (EU) serves as one of the most successful integration models in the 
world, not only in terms of the economic aspects but also social dimensions. Comparing 
the EU to Arab integration is to have a benchmark of effectual integration agreement on 
both the economic and social planes. This comparison acknowledges the differences 
between the two regions, especially the historical and social dimensions that shape the 
democratic frameworks of the contemporary Europe.  
Further, the EU intra-trade represents around 62% of the total EU trade, which is 
higher than the intra-trade results of  the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), which is a trade agreement between The United States of America, Canada, 
and Mexico that witness an average of 49% of intra-trade as compared to the member 
states’ total trade (NAFTA: Statistics, 2014). The EU member states have highly invested 
in the social welfare of their citizens, where the share of social benefits as a percentage of 
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the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has ranged from 28% such as the case of 
Sweden to the highest contribution among all EU member states in the case of Germany, 
where the GDP share on social spending has reached almost 55% (European Report, 
1997).  
The EU model proves that integration agreements are pursued among states not 
only for economic reasons but also political dimensions (Galal and Hoekman, 1997). 
After the Second World War, EU states have developed a regional block that has enabled 
them to enjoy stronger negotiation capacities with international institutions such as the 
World Bank and the World Trade Organization (WTO) and better access to markets on 
both regional and global levels (Hosny, 2013).  
Developmental states aim at achieving economic growth, yet, GDP growth is not 
the absolute target of development as argued by neoclassical economists, who only 
measure economic development in terms of GDP growth and ignore human development 
indices. The state should utilize this increase in GDP growth towards the development of 
human capabilities, mainly through provisioning the citizens’ rights to education and 
healthcare services. Developing human capabilities by the state is both the “mean and end 
to development” since skilled labour, which is a result of improving people’s capabilities, 
are the tools to develop states’ agricultural and industrial bases, thus achieving multiples 
of economic growth (Sen, 2009, p. 3).  
Arab countries are in need of ‘real’ regional integration that can enhance their 
economic performance, develop the human capabilities of the Arab people, especially 
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access to education and healthcare services, and establish a strong agricultural and 
industrial base that is sustainable, as opposed the vulnerable oil sector. Arab countries 
witness a large GDP discrepancy, where rich oil-exporting states are reluctant to pursue 
integration agreements with economically weaker non-oil exporting states. While this 
acts a prescription of the solution the actual status quo proves that Petro-states are 
reluctant to bear the economic costs of integration through sharing the economic returns 
with other states (Karl, 1997). Nevertheless, these oil-exporting states are suffering from 
a very poor industrial profile, which is threatening the sustainability of their economic 
growth. The sole dependence on oil is considered an economic disease, which is similar 
to the “Dutch disease”, when Holland became highly dependent on natural gas returns 
(Hudson, 1999). United Arab Emirates has been an exceptional case among Arab oil-
states, since the mid-1990s, as their political leaders have been developing other non-oil 
sectors to derive growth (WITS, 2015). 
This thesis will focus on the trade relations among Arab states within the GAFTA 
agreement and how these countries can develop their industrial and agricultural bases 
aside from the vulnerable oil sector in order to have sustainable economic growth since 
oil reserve will end within twenty years given the current oil-extraction rates. Sen argues 
that economic growth is crucial to finance the projects needed to develop human capital. 
Due to space limitations, this thesis will only cover the economic growth pillar of trade 




Another aspect that is not covered in this thesis, although crucial to understanding 
the future of Arab integration agreements is the role of social movements, especially after 
the Arab Spring, in opposing the corrupted regimes ruling these countries. Arab countries 
have been suffering from dictatorship regimes that have not responded to the needs of the 
people in Arab countries. In fact, the corrupted leaders have been rent seekers, who have 
no intention for real development for Arab economies or infrastructures. Arab states since 
the 2000s have witnessed social movements that have requested real economic and 
political development across Arab states that were crystallized after the Arab Spring. The 
results of these social movements are very minimal, especially with the corruption and 
the lack of transparency in the regimes in most Arab states. Arab countries, for example 
Egypt and Syria have hidden budgets and governmental provisions that cannot be 
reviewed by the public. These budgets are mainly abused by the corrupted elites and 
ruler, who have abused the system and legislations to serve their own interests, for 
example, the elections period law in Egypt which allowed the president to have infinite 
number of election rounds. Nevertheless, Arab states are struggling to take their first 
steps towards achieving welfare state, which results from tripartite governance formed 
from: the state, the social movements, and the private sector that should be governed by 
the state in order to avoid negative externalities, such as monopolistic acts (Arafat, 2009).   
Further, in order to achieve sustainable economic growth that assures long-term 
results, Arab states should develop other non-oil sectors through assessing local and 
regional comparative advantages, which are dynamically developed through state-centric 
strategic plans. The targeted Arab integration necessitates a development of the Arab 
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infrastructure and communication facilities in order to lower transaction and 
transportation costs thus increase Arab intra-trade (Saidi, 2003). States also need to 
govern the operations of the private sector in a way that minimizes market externalities, 
such as monopolistic movements. The private sector can play a role in achieving 
economic growth, for example providing employment opportunities (Chauffor, 2013). 
Arab countries should strategically plan integration in a way that serves human 
development as well as economic growth, especially decreasing unemployment rates, 
increasing access to education, and providing better health services. Arab states should 
effectively engage in integration attempts after careful cost benefit analysis between the 
gains (economic and political) from cooperation and the cost of integration attempts, 
which should be governed by supranational institutions (Harders and Legrenzi, 2008). 
This thesis aims at understanding the political and economic obstacles that have 
hindered Arab integration attempts through a comprehensive analysis of Arab integration 
and its legacy. This thesis will describe the existing situation of integration and problems 
and will prescribe a solution that hopefully can be implemented by the politicians and 
decision makers in the Arab region. The thesis will simulate the economic gains of Arab 
integration given the actual Arab bilateral and multilateral trade agreements and tariff 
structure in case of removing intra-tariffs and having a Pan-Arab economy. Pan-Arabism 
has been an ideology that espouses socialist principles against the Western intervention in 
the Middle East. Pan-Arabism was highly popular in the 1950s and 1960s, where Arab 
countries adopted Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) policies, which advocate for 
replacing the imports of foreign goods by domestic products (Djoufelkit-Cottenet, 2008).  
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I argue that Arab economic integration can only be achieved through 
developmental states that have a vision to understand that “regional agreements are not 
merely about economics. They typically have political objectives, and political gains may 
offset or outweigh economic costs. While it is difficult to attach the appropriate weight to 
each side of the equation, the challenge is to ensure that regional integration results in the 
attainment of overall net gains” (Galal and Hoekman, 2003, p. 3). Having effective 
supranational institutions that can balance the economic gains among member states and 
compensate economically weaker member states is a condition to successful Arab 
integration (Hoekman and Messerlin, 2002, p. 2). Arab integration future attempts will 
only remain on paper unless the development of the existing supranational institutions 
that will take years of social struggles against the existing dictatorship regimes.   
The majority of Arab countries share a number of factors that could lead to 
effective integration and enhance the scope and scale of trade relations, such as sharing a 
common language and having geographical proximity (Saidi, 2003). However, Arab 
countries integration results across all agreements have been very minimal. The GAFTA, 
since its formation in 1997 has not achieved significant intra-regional integration results, 
yet, the GAFTA has been one of the most successful agreements, when compared with 
past Arab integration agreements, since it entailed almost all Arab states, where the 
GAFTA was signed by 18 member states and has had 4 ‘candidate’ states. The GAFTA 
was able to promote intra-Arab trade but on a very limited scale since its establishment in 
1997.  Renegotiating the GAFTA with the 18 member states can be the starting point for 
future Arab integration agreements (Zorob, 2008).  
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The methodology applied in this study is a comparative analysis that depends 
mainly on secondary materials and statistical databases. The methodology involved 
statistical analyses that simulate the economic benefits of Arab intra-regional 
cooperation, focusing on the eighteen member countries of the GAFTA using the World 
Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) software and the United Nations (UN) COMTRADE 
data. The economic simulation as a methodology can provide a realistic understanding of 
future scenarios since it is using the actual trade figures and tariff rates within states.  
First, I analyzed the total intra-Arab trade data especially the non-oil products 
since most Arab countries have a high percentage of self-sufficiency in oil products. 
Further, I analyzed the ratio of the total intra-Arab trade to the total Arab external trade 
and demonstrated the gross exports and gross imports values at the bilateral levels. The 
collected data was the main input for a trade simulation, which demonstrated the 
incremental intra-trade in case of satisfying the imports gap via a ‘pan Arab self-
sufficiency’, where Arab countries substitute imports from non-Arab states by 
commodities produced by the GAFTA members.  
Further, the outcomes of the simulation were analyzed using the WITS Outcomes 
Indicators, which is a trade module that uses the UN COMTRADE data to construct 
indices that can assess the intra-Arab trade based on: 1) the growth opportunities of 
exports and imports given the composition and orientation factors and 2) the survival rate 
of export relationships through assessing the trade and tariff indicators along with other 
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economic indicators such as the complementarity index
3
. These indicators were extracted 
from the UN World Development Indicators database. The results of the simulation show 
that unless Arab states strategically plan for their comparative advantages and enhance 
their agricultural and industrial basis the output of integration will be very low or will 
cause “trade diversion,” where imports are shifted from low cost non-member states to 
high-cost member states, thus negatively impacting the trade balances of importing 
countries. For example, Arab states are highly dependent on the Chinese market, and in 
case of Pan-Arabism, imports from other Arab states will be of less quality and higher 
price, at least on the short-term (Viner, 1950). 
Having an Arab leader that motivates other states towards the full implementation 
of agreements is crucial for effectual Arab integration. Samiha Fawz (2003) analyzes the 
role of a leading state in integration and demonstrates how a leading state can direct other 
countries towards achieving integration. Germany played the leading role in the EU via 
Bundesbank’s efforts in leading the European Monetary Union and the European Central 
Bank by formulating stable economic policies, which facilitated the integration results in 
the 1960s and 70s. Germany has captured the economic gains of integration through 
having a larger access to European markets, yet, other European states gained the benefits 
of integration, mainly better access to regional resources and markets and better 
negotiation power on the international level, through forming a regional economic and 
political block (Hosny, 2013).  
                                                          
3
“The complementarity index measures the degree to which the export pattern of one country matches the 
import pattern of another. A high degree of complementarity is assumed to indicate more favorable 
prospects for a successful trade arrangement” 
source:http://www.unescap.org/tid/aptiad/index_cmpl_fm.aspx, accessed 7/12/2013. 
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The lack of a leader is negatively impacting integration attempts. Arab leadership 
is integration is not likely to happen given the rent-seeking Egyptian leaders, who have 
relied on the US-aid and ignored the development of their economy and infrastructure 
(Momani, 2003). Meanwhile, Arab petro-states are highly dependent on the US market 
for their oil exports. Saudi Arabia, for example, exports more than 25% of its oil to USA 
(WITS, 2015).  In fact, analyzing Arab petro-states’ trade profiles challenges the 
possibility of future Arab integration since they export mainly to Northern states and oil 
represents an average of 80% of Gulf countries exports (WITS, 2015).  The Arab world is 
witnessing effectual  social movements, which still have a long road to achieve their 
targeted welfare results, and these movements are the first step towards more democratic 
governments that can respond to social needs and work for real economic development 
that entail economic growth and human development (Acemoglu, Hassan and Tahoun, 
2014). 
Unlike the neoclassical trade liberalization, which calls for a sudden removal of 
all tariff barriers, trade liberalization in the GAFTA has been taken gradually on steps 
and not through a ‘shock therapy’, since infant industry protection is needed by states to 
develop comparative advantages. However, protectionism has to be for competitive 
reasons; otherwise, the industrial sector will lose its motives to develop (Lin, 2009). 
Additionally, the removal of tariffs is only granted for GAFTA members, which have 
very low intra-trade that barely reaches 7% of Arab total trade (Saidi, 2003). Arab states, 
especially the non-oil exporting countries, are highly dependent on tariff revenues. The 
loss in tariff revenues should be compensated on the short term through other progressive 
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tax forms by the state, and should be replaced by incremental trade revenues in the long 
term (Galal and Hoekman, 2003). 
This thesis proceeds through five chapters. The next chapter will provide 
substantive review on integration theories, followed by a chapter on Arab integration 
politics, which mainly discusses the impact of Arab petro-states on the success potential 
of Arab integration attempts. The fourth chapter will be the economic simulation of Arab 
integration, which will be conducted through the World Bank’s WITS simulation 
software. The last chapter of this thesis will conclude the future of Arab integration. In 
the end, I will argue that unless Arab states develop their “dynamic” comparative 
advantages, Arab integration will have a minimal or even a negative impact since it will 
result in trade diversion. States can accept short-term losses that can result from trade 
diversion on condition that trade creation will be the result of developing comparative 










viewChapter Two: Literature Re2.  
Since the 1950s, many theories have been developed by well-known scholars who 
have examined the concepts of economic and political integration and regionalization. In 
order to have a comprehensive understanding of regionalism and regional integration, this 
chapter will examine the main theories of regionalism that can be divided into two 
groups, namely political science and economics. Each group offers distinct general 
approaches, with multiple varieties within, that are of greatest importance to this thesis 
(Tavares, 2004; Cai 2010).  
2.1 Political Science Approaches 
Beginning first with the political science approaches to regionalism and regional 
integration, the Marxist theory of integration emphasizes how integration works for 
serving global capitalism mainly via ensuring an ideological climate that advocates for 
protecting private ownership of the means of production and trade. Integration would 
serve the bourgeoisies’ interest in growth through “competition between capitals” in a 
way that ensures sustainability of trade between capitalist enterprises and their 
accumulation of capital. The role of the state is limited to securing an environment for 
commerce that assures private property protection, the provision of labour force, and the 
existence of domestic markets that serves the goals of capitalism (Cocks, 1980).  
Analyzing the power relations in integration agreements necessitates an 
understanding of the work of Antonio Gramsci, the Italian Marxist theorist, whose 
concept of ‘hegemony’ and power relations within states is crucial to analyzing 
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integration agreements. Gramsci sheds light on how modern capitalism allowed 
bourgeoisies to maintain their economic dominance through power relations within 
economic and political parties within societies (Börzel, 2014). In the contemporary 
world, the hegemony of multinational capitalist corporations has influenced bilateral and 
multilateral agreements in a way that continue to serve capitalists interests. For example, 
chapter eleven in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which is a trade 
agreement between USA, Canada, and Mexico, allows multinational corporations to sue 
states in a way that benefits capitalism institutions and dismantles state sovereignty
4
 
(Grinspun and Mills, 2012).  
Further, many theories within the discipline of International Relations have 
analyzed integration within states from different lenses. For examples, dependency theory 
emphasizes how resources of poor states “periphery” are transferred to a “core” of rich 
and developed states. The Marxist, Walter Rodney, in his book How Europe 
Underdeveloped Africa, emphasizes how Africa’s resources were exploited by European 
colonialism. In the case of developing countries, regional integration can be a solution to 
decrease the dependency of the South on the North through economic and political 
integration (Hosny, 2013).  
Moreover, another dominant theory within the discipline of International 
Relations is post-colonialism, which highlights the “important degree of continuity and 
persistence of colonial forms of power in contemporary power world politics”. Post-
                                                          
4 Chapter 11 in the NAFTA establishes a framework of rules to investors from NAFTA 
by which they can use as settlement procedures. These rules are in fact providing a 





colonialism provides a tool in understanding the power relations that shapes the global 
economy and how the North maintains its dominance on the South (Baylis, Smith, and 
Owens, 2008). Both Marxist and postcolonial approaches have tended to depict the state 
as a tool of capital in a way that downplays its ability to act autonomously for its socio-
economic interests. Additionally, the previously mentioned theories have not 
significantly emphasized the state’s role in leading integration, where they consider the 
state as a ‘facilitator’ not as the main agent in shaping and deriving integration 
agreements and economic development.  
There are integration theories that mainly focused on the factors that shape 
regional integration agreements such ‘functionalism’, which is a theory of international 
relations that views economic integration as an inevitable process within states that 
develops as states integrate in certain functional economic, technological, and societal 
areas. David Mitrany, who is considered one of the founding thinkers of functionalism, 
emphasizes that integration in one of these sector will result in a “spillover effect” across 
other sectors. For example, integration in a specific technical sector will increase the 
momentum of integration in other industrial sectors (Mitrany, 1966). Neofunctionalism, 
another predominant theory of integration, is premised on the view that regional 
integration is an intentional process that is mainly driven by the political elites of 
involved states in an integration agreement aimed at maximizing their political and 
economic advantages. In contrast to Mitranty, Ernst Haas, a lead neofunctionalist, views 
the “spillover effect” as a contrived process rather than an inevitable route (Haas, 1958).  
More recently, intergovernmentalism has emerged as a theory that rejects the core 
ideas of both functionalism and neofunctionalism, especially the “spillover effect”, and 
19 
 
argues that integration is a “state-driven” process, where states and national governments 
determine the scope and scale of integration with other states, mainly through developing 
the required economic and political conditions. Andrew Moravcsik argues that 
neofunctionalism underestimates the state’s role in deriving integration and emphasizes 
that governments control the speed of integration and balance states’ power within 
supranational institutions (Moravcsik, 1991).  
Moravcsik emphasizes that regional integration can be achieved most effectively 
through intergovernmental agreements, which mainly aim to maximize national powers 
through a set of political bargains among involved states (Tavares, 2004). In agreement 
with Moravcsik’s understanding of regionalism, many scholars have argued that regional 
integration is best achieved through a state-driven process. For example, Jagdish 
Bhagwati, though a great advocate for free markets and minimum state intervention in the 
economy, emphasizes that the state plays a central role in achieving regional integration, 
where Bhagwati defines regionalism as a preferential trade agreement among a subset of 
nations (Bhagwati, 1999). Andrew Gamble and Anthony Payne also define regionalism 
as a “state-led project” that aims at maximizing the economic and political gains of 
member states (Gamble and Payne, 1996). Additionally, Joseph Nye (1968) defines 
international integration from a state-centric approach, where he defines regionalism as 
“a limited number of states linked together by a geographical relationship and by a degree 
of mutual interdependence” (Nye, 1968, p. VII).  
Nevertheless, intergovernmentalism emphasizes the importance of national 
governments in integration agreements. Domestic policies might change, yet, a state-
20 
 
centric vision of developing comparative dynamic advantages takes decades, which need 
a state-centric approach and an institutional approach not just a ‘governmental’ approach. 
Neoliberal institutionalism’s core ideas emphasize the long term state-centric approach in 
leading international politics and regionalization, where states cooperate to avoid market 
failures of neoliberalism. Neoliberal institutionalism not only agrees with 
intergovernmentalism on the state’s role but also acknowledges capitalism as a system 
that is dominating the global economy and sheds light on its limitations and failures, for 
example monopolistic act (Lin, 2009). Robert Keohane, whose widely-read book After 
Hegemony (1984) became associated with the theory of neoliberal institutionalism, 
emphasizes the relation among market-economies, where states can cooperate through 
institutional frameworks to maximize their economic and political benefits (Keohane, 
1984).  
Achieving effectual integration agreements necessitates the existence of 
supranational institutions that can ensure the implementation of agreements conditions. 
Supranationalism is a decision making process rather than an integration theory that aims 
at controlling the powers of states within an agreement by independent officials or 
elected representatives of member states in order to balance the states’ economic and 
political gains from integration agreements. Supranationalism is a key issue to be 
considered when examining neoliberal institutionalism since many scholars argue that 
having effective supranational institutions is a pre-condition for the effective governance 
of states’ agreements (Cai, 2010). 
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The failure and success of a regional integration agreement are mainly measured 
by politicians through a comparison of an agreement’s stated goals to its actual 
achievements. The existence of strong supranational institutions that enforce the 
implementation of agreements conditions is argued by political science scholars to be 
crucial for the success of integration agreements. The success of the EU as an integration 
model has been attributed to the existence of effective supranational institutions, which 
govern and balance the outcomes of integration, especially economic gains (Mattli, 
1999).The EU supranational institutions are primarily the European Parliament, which 
serves as the legislative entity; the European Commission, which serve as the executive 
agency; and the European Central Bank (ECB), which serves as the economic pillar of 
the EU, financing regional EU projects (Galal and Hoekman, 2003). 
In this thesis, I argue that theorizing regional integration agreements is 
multidimensional, where multiple theories can be valid for theorizing a specific 
integration agreement. James Caporaso (1998) has stated that scholars should 
differentiate between the validity of an integration theory and whether the conditions 
needed for that theory has been met or not. “As the values of the explanatory variables 
become weak, the appropriate response is not to reject the theory; instead we should 
simply draw out the implications for variation in the phenomena to be explained- 
generally the smaller the values, the less the impact, all the way to the limiting case 
where the quantities of the explanatory variables approach zero” (Caporaso, 1998, p. 6). 
For example, the EU has witnessed a form of effective neoliberal institutionalism since 
the agreement was signed between the EU member states, yet, the EU can be theorized 
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from a neofunctionalist approach, where the ‘positive spillover effect’ in one economic 
sector has induced strong incentive for more integration across other sectors.  
Additionally, Timothy Shaw and Fred Söderbaum (2003) agree with Caporaso in 
differentiating the conditionality of an integration theory from its validity. Shaw 
emphasizes that an integration agreement can be mainly shaped by states, yet, non-state 
actors, such as private institutions, also play a role in shaping and achieving integration 
agreements (Bøås, Marchand, and Shaw, 2005).  
Certain integration theories only examine the political dimensions of integration 
while other theories only focus on the economic scope of integration. Nevertheless, I 
argue that neoliberal institutionalism provides the best understanding of integration 
theory since it significantly acknowledges the state as the main actor in the integration 
process, where states derive integration on a macro-level scale, both economic and 
political. Neoliberal institutionalism effectively describes the shortcomings of capitalism 
as a global economic system and provides an “emphasis on the effects of international 
institutions and practices of state behavior” in a way that can help to control market 
imperfections (Keohane, 1984, p. 25).  
2.2 Economic Approaches 
Economic approaches provide a different lens through which we can understand 
integration, where economic approaches are mainly concerned with analyzing the 
economic gains of integration. The failure of integration agreements, such as the 
GAFTA, has resulted mainly from the unequal balance of the distribution of the 
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economic gains that usually occur when large countries capture the major benefits of 
agreements, especially in the area of trade (Galal and Hoekman, 2003). The balance of 
economic gains, which is mainly done through supranational institutions and large 
member states, is crucial to the success of integration agreements. In fact, analyzing the 
economic dimension of integration is crucial to having a more robust understanding of 
integration agreements. This section will only focus on two dominant theories, which 
discuss the process and gains of economic integration and regionalism: ‘regional 
economic integration’ and ‘optimal currency’ theories.  
Regional economic integration theory analyzes the progression of economic 
interdependence through a stage process that starts with a preferential trade area, then a 
free trade area, customs union, common market, and finally economic and political union 
(Balassa, 1962). Table 1 shows Balassa’s progression of economic interdependence.  
Table 1 
 













1. Free trade area x     
2. Customs Union x x    
3. Common market x x x   
4. Economic union x x x x  
5. Total economic 
integration 
x x x x X 
Source: (Nye, 1968). 
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A well-known example of a custom union, where member countries apply 
common external tariffs on imported commodities, is the European Community (EC), 
which was founded in 1957 by France, Italy, West Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, and 
Luxembourg in order to bring economic prosperity to member countries and limit US 
economic hegemony. Moreover, the common market allows a higher level of integration 
among member states since it allows for the free movement of factors of production 
between member states, namely labour and capital. In 1993, the EU was established and 
has been able to achieve well performing common market among EU member states, 
where EU intra-trade reached almost 68 % of the EU member states’ total trade. The EC 
has remained as an executive subsidiary of the EU that is responsible for EU integration 
legislations (Mattli, 1999).  
Finally, according to Balasaa’s theory of economic integration, the economic 
union represents the final and most advanced form of economic integration, where the 
monetary and fiscal policies of member countries are harmonized and in some cases 
unified. The EU serves as an ideal example of economic union, where the EU member 
countries have formed a monetary union through using the same currency, namely the 
Euro (Hosny, 2013). 
The optimal currency theory, which was founded by the pioneer economist Robert 
Mundell, also demonstrates the socio-economic benefits of using a common currency, 
which are mainly achieving better labour and capital mobility and a lower degree of 
exchange rate volatility. These benefits, it is argued, should enhance the economic 
growth of member states (Mundell, 1961). The stability of exchange rates will result in 
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increasing trade volumes with other countries and synchronize the economic performance 
within member countries (Rose and Patrick, 2001; Rose and Wincoop, 2001; Fielding 
and Shields, 2005). The increase in trade volumes, which happens as a result of 
integration agreements, is referred to as “trade expansion” (Meade, 1955). 
On the other hand, using a common currency has economic disadvantages such as 
limiting the state’s power in controlling local economies through currency devaluation 
that can increase exports and decrease imports, thus enhancing balance of trade. 
However, the overall gains of having a common currency outweigh its negative 
implications since having a common currency can enhance intra-regional trade volumes 
(Mursa, 2014). The implications of regional integration can negatively impact sovereign 
authority of member states of an integration agreement. However, reaching a “permissive 
consensus” that can be governed through supranational institutions can maximize the 
economic and political welfare of member states of a regional integration agreement (Cai, 
2010, p. 7).   
In analyzing integration, the economic classification approach has been mainly 
concerned about analyzing the economic gains of integration agreements. One cannot 
analyze the possible positive and negative consequences of an economic integration 
agreement without referring to the pioneer work of Jacob Viner (1950), who developed 
the definition of “static gains” of economic integration, namely “trade creation” and 
“trade diversion.” Trade creation occurs when countries engaged in a trade agreement 
shift their trade patterns in one or more commodities from a high-cost producing country 
to a low-cost supplying member country. On the other hand, trade diversion refers to the 
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case in which trade patterns shift from a low cost non-member country to a higher-cost 
member country. This usually results from a common tariff that protects that the high-
cost supplier within the agreement (Viner, 1950).  
Trade creation and trade diversion can be illustrated using the numerical example 
in the following table which sows the price of commodity X in three countries.  
 Country A Country B Country C 
Price of Commodity 
X 
36 25 15 
 
Suppose that county A enters an agreement with country B or C, in both cases, 
country A will be better off since the domestic price of commodity X in country A (36) is 
higher than in country B (25) or C (15). The direction of trade will shift from country A 
(the high cost member) to a low-cost member (Country B or C). Nevertheless, if country 
A levies a 100% tariff on commodity X then it would buy it from the country C, which is 
the lowest cost producer. If country A and B only enter a Free Trade Area (FTA) 
agreement , then country A will buy commodity X from country B selling at 25 and not 
from country C (selling at 30 due to the applied tariff). This case is known as trade 
diversion, where the direction of trade has shifted from an originally low cost non-
member state (country C) to a high-cost member country (country B).   
Additionally, the ‘dynamic gains’ of integration were identified by Balassa, where 
he states that economic integration will result in increased competition, better technology 
transfer, and improved productivity (Balassa 1962). The ‘dynamic gains’ of integration 
open the door for the discussion about ‘New Regionalism’, where  scholars argue that 
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integration has some new forms compared to old forms of regionalism in the 1950s and 
60s, as a result of the impact of globalization and ‘free markets’.  
Robert Lawrence (1997) summarizes the differences between old and new 
regionalism in a simple tabular chart: 
 
Old Regionalism New Regionalism 
Import substitution Export orientation 
Planned allocation of resources Market allocation of resources 
Led by governments Led by private firms 
Mainly industrial products All good, services, and investments 
Source: Lawrence (1997) 
In fact, in both ‘old regionalism’ and ‘new regionalism’, the state plays a role in 
driving economic growth, yet, ‘new’ regionalists argue that the state’s role should be 
minimal as ‘free trade’ and ‘free markets’ are  the main route to achieving economic 
growth. These neoliberal ideas diminish the role of the state in leading economic growth, 
yet, neoliberal institutionalists are proponents of developmental states and emphasize the 
state’s role in correcting market imperfections and leading economic development. Both 
Keynesian economists and neoliberal institutionalists emphasize the importance of state 
intervention in the economy, especially for developing dynamic comparative advantages 
and correcting market imperfections such as monopolistic acts.  
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Ha-Joon Chang, who is a Keynesian economist, debunks the ideas of ‘new 
regionalism’ that argue that economic growth can only be achieved through free markets 
that has no or minimal state intervention (Chang, 2008). Unlike New Regionalism, which 
underestimates the state’s role in deriving economic growth, neoliberal institutionalists 
emphasize the state’s role in achieving economic growth while correcting market 
imperfections. Private firms can play a role in increasing trade relationships between 
countries, yet the state is the actual agent and structure in shaping integration agreements. 
The state is the agent that officially signs integration agreements with other states and 
provides the structural framework for the success of integration agreements through 
providing the needed governing supranational institutions. 
 Moreover, states are responsible for developing their economies in a way that can 
protect infant industries. Chang (2008) refutes the idea that ‘free trade’ and ‘free markets’ 
are the only way to development. Chang uses the South Korean model to illustrate his 
argument and states that: “As South Korea shows, active participation in international 
trade does not require free trade. Indeed, had South Korea pursued free trade and not 
promoted infant industries, it would not have become a major trading nation” (Chang, 
2008, p. 58).  
Further, Chang continues his critique of the neoliberal mantra, which advocate for 
the inefficiency of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and provides many successful 
examples of SOEs such as Singapore Airlines, Renault (car manufacturers) in France, and 
Petrobras in Brasil. Chang effectively argues that states have proven to be efficient in 
developing economies and shaping integration agreements. Like Keynesian economists, 
29 
 
neoliberal institutionalists agree that state’s intervention in the economy is crucial to 
providing the needed infrastructure, financing infant domestic industries, and developing 
price controls and protective mechanisms that can enable infant industries to reach a level 
of maturity, where they can compete in international markets (Fridell, 2008). However, 
neoliberal institutionlists disagree with Keynesian economists on the ‘scope and scale’ of 
intervention. Lin argues that the state must protect infant industries to a certain limit in 
order to avoid devastating state’s resources and to enhance the competitiveness of 
commodities through global competition. The state cannot subsidize all sectors and has to 
prioritize the sectors to subsidize based on an assessment of the market acceptance in 
order to minimize the financial risk (Lin and Chang, 2009). 
Additionally, state’s intervention in the economy is also crucial to govern 
integration agreements since ‘free markets’ do not result in fair integration agreements 
since stronger member states will capture most of the economic gains and weaker states 
will have a minimal share, if any, of the economic and political returns. In fact, many of 
failing integration agreements have resulted from the unbalanced split of economic gains, 
for example the case of the NAFTA, since the US captured the major benefits of the 
agreement, where the Mexican markets were flooded by American products, which has 
resulted in increasing the unemployment rates in Mexico (Hinojosa-Ojeda, Robinson, and 
De Paolis, 1999). 
One of the main factors that have enabled the success of European integration has 
been the compensation mechanisms, also referred to as preferential terms of trade, 
enforced by the EC, where smaller countries are compensated in order to induce them 
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towards more integration that will achieve real growth among all member states. These 
redistribution mechanisms were administered through the EU supranational institutions, 
namely the ECB and the EC, and have led to achieving fair agreement outcomes (see 
Hoekman and Messerlin, 2002). Effective supranational administration was evident in the 
income redistribution mechanisms that were adopted by the European commission and 
the ECB after the “European Single Market Program”, which was signed in 1992. These 
mechanisms offered compensations to smaller EU countries, for example Italy, which 
was relatively negatively impacted by integration, where these compensations took the 
forms of “exception to trade liberalization, long transition periods, transfers from the 
budget (subsidies), or issue linkage”. For example, Germany was the largest contributor 
to EC intra-trade, where it contributed by around 30% of total intra-trade, meanwhile, 
Italy only contributed by 11%. Italy was compensated through special reduction schemes 
in tariffs on the agricultural products since Italy had a relative comparative advantage in 
agricultural commodities and was granted soft loans by by the European Investment Bank 
for infrastructure and related types of projects (Hoekman and Messerlin, 2002). 
 
2.3 GDP growth and development 
Achieving an increase in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of member countries 
of an integration agreement is usually one of the targets of integration, yet, GDP growth 
should not be the sole target of integration. States have to direct the GDP growth towards 
increasing the capabilities of people, mainly through developing welfare states that invest 
in education and healthcare systems. In fact, enhancing human capabilities is the mean to 
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achieve real economic development since people are the agents of change and 
development. This standpoint has been economist Amartya Sen’s core argument since the 
1980s. Rather than the traditional view of neoclassical economists, who mainly measure 
development in terms of absolute economic growth, Sen (1999) shows that increasing the 
capabilities of people, mainly through improved access to education and healthcare, is 
both the means and end to development. Sen also emphasizes that many low per capita 
income countries could have better development results than other wealthier countries. 
For example, the state of Kerala in India has a higher life expectancy rate and more 
access to education and healthcare services than other countries with her per capita 
income. Kerala in India, as well as Cuba, has witnessed strong state intervention to 
achieve economic and human development. The state’s role was evident in the agrarian 
reform implemented in the 1960s. Additionally, the public food rationing system in 
Kerala was responsible for reducing the poverty and malnutrition among the poorest 
Indians in that society (Sen, 1999; UNDP, 2013). 
Due to the space limitation, this thesis has shortcomings of analyzing the impact 
of GDP growth on developing human capabilities in the Arab region using Sen’s 
capabilities approach. However, as Sen emphasizes, economic growth is crucial to 
achieving economic development as it is the mean to developing human capabilities 
through financing education and health programs. This thesis will mainly focus on the 
economic dimension of integration and how Arab states can develop their dynamic 
comparative advantages in order to have ‘sustainable’ GDP growth that can be used for 
developing human capabilities of the Arab countries’ people.  
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In fact, understanding the complexity and the multidimensional aspects of 
development can have significant implications on development policies and practices. 
The developmental state is responsible for achieving real development, both on the 
economic and human levels. States, not free markets, spur economic growth. From a 
developmental perspective, states should utilize the growth in GDP to develop human 
capabilities via ‘provisioning’ public necessities, such as education and healthcare 
services. These state-led provisions should result in reducing inequalities and enhancing 
people’s capabilities, such as education and healthcare standards (Sen, 1999). Integration 
agreements should focus not only on the economic dimensions but also on social and 
human development. There are several examples of integration agreements that have 
sought to explicitly balance the two goals of economic and human development.   
One of the well-known regional integration agreements, which are capitalizing on 
a state-led alternative trade approach, is the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our 
America (ALBA). The ALBA agreement has witnessed an intergovernmental approach 
that has aimed for increasing intra-regional trade along with maximizing the social 
welfare of Latin American people. The trade relations in the ALBA reject the 
neoclassical trade models that neglect social efficiency. For example, the trade 
relationship between Cuba and Venezuela, where the latter exports oil products to the 
former in return for medical services, thus achieving mutual trade and social welfare 
(Fridell, 2013).  
Another limitation of this thesis is that it doesn’t analyze the social and historical 
dimensions of the development of Arab states. In fact, understanding the power of social 
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movements in the Middle East and their role in confronting the dictatorship regimes that 
have been ruling in many Arab countries is crucial to analyzing the future of the GAFTA 
and other integration agreements. One of the factors that have stinted the attempts of 
Arab integration is the rent seeking rulers. Arab states, from Tunisia to Yemen, have been 
cursed by corrupted elites, who acted as rent seekers for the outcomes of trade 
agreements and gave minimal care to develop their economies and comparative 
advantages (see Levey, 2011; Transparency International, 2015; Acemoglu, Hassan and 
Tahoun, 2014).  Taking the EU as a successful model of integration in this thesis is 
mainly to benchmark on a model that has incorporated an economic and social dimension 
of integration. Nevertheless, the EU has witnessed a long history of social movements 
since the 1800s that have led to the development of welfare states that effectively respond 
to the needs of the people (see Esping-Anderson, 1999). 
2.4 The EU as a successful model of integration 
The EU, as an integration model, is not free of socio-economic problems.  In fact, 
the EU has solid economic rules that regulates trade agreements and much less robust 
social rules, where “social Europe lags behind economic Europe; ‘market creation’ runs 
ahead of ‘market correction’; and so on” (Grahl, 2009, p. 290). Nevertheless, even with 
the existing problems, the EU continues to serve as a unique model for integration not 
only on the economic plane but also at the social level. The EU has achieved impressive 
economic growth, particularly in the mid-1990s, and intra-regional trade among member 
states along with social provisioning especially in the education and healthcare systems 
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that have resulted in achieving high development rates with less inequality than is found 
in countries of other integration agreements.  
After the Second World War, the idea of European economic integration was 
developed, where European countries aimed at achieving a prosperous integrated 
economy. In 1951, the Treaty of Paris was signed by Belgium, France, Italy, West 
Germany, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. The treaty of Paris set a solid base for 
further European integration, which evolved in 1952 with the formation of the European 
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).It is worth mentioning that the ECSC was the first 
organization that implemented the principles of supranationalism since governance was 
managed through states’ representatives. Integration among European countries increased 
significantly in 1957 by the signature of the Treaty of Rome and the establishment of the 
European Community (EC), which was signed by Germany, Italy, France, Belgium, 
Luxemburg, and Netherlands. The EC enlarged significantly in 1973 with the accession 
of the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark. 
Further, more European countries continued to join the EC to gain the benefits of 
the economic and political integration. Greece joined in 1981, followed by Spain and 
Portugal in 1986. The economic performance of Greece, Spain, and Portugal is very poor 
when compared to larger EU member states such as England, Germany, or France, yet, 
the EU remains a successful integration model that has managed economic gains and 
social benchmarks for all member states. In 1995, three more states joined the EC -
Austria, Finland, and Sweden. During this period, integration has gone beyond trade 
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liberalization and went into a deeper level of integration, especially compensation 
policies for weaker states that are governed through supranational institutions.   
In 1979, the European Monetary System was established, where the member 
countries of the EC linked their currencies to each other to prevent currency fluctuation 
and maintain stable exchange rates. In 1992, the community implemented the Maastricht 
Treaty on European Monetary and Political Union, which was a transformation step in 
the history of the integration of European countries. The EC changed its name to the EU 
in November 1993 (Mattli, 1999). 
In June 1998, the European Central Bank (ECB) was established. The ECB has 
played a major role in harmonizing the monetary policies in the Euro area since 1999, 
which was the official year of launching the Euro as a common currency among the 
members of the EU. It is worth mentioning that Sweden, Denmark, and the United 
Kingdom have not used the euro as a currency, yet, although they have reserved the right 
to use it later (Salvatore, 2002). These states have stated their fears of “excessive 
centralization of decision-making in the European Union” that can negatively impact 
their economies (Mursa, 2014).  
Kristin Archick, the well-known specialist in European Affairs, highlights that the 
Eurozone has witnessed a debt crisis since 2009 when the Greek government borrowed 
from the international financial markets to solve its budget deficit. The economic crisis 
has negatively hit the Eurozone member states, especially the smaller countries like 
Greece. The impact of the crisis has resulted in a deficit in the Balance of Payments 
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(BOPs) and increased the governmental debt levels, which negatively impacted social 
expenditures in many EU member countries. In 2009, Greece was on risk of defaulting on 
its debt. The public debt and poor economic performance within the Euro zone 
transferred to other European countries, such as Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Italy. The 
crisis has led to increasing unemployment rates and lowering economic growth rates 
across the Eurozone (Archick, 2015). 
The Eurozone has been suffering the consequences of the 2008 recession, which 
is evident in the Germany-Greece debt issue, when Germany has refused to bailout 
Greece. Many have argued Greece issue is the start of the Eurozone collapse, especially 
with the possibility of Greece’s abandon of the Euro or even quitting the EU agreement. 
Asking Greece to cut the social spending represents the struggle between neoliberalism 
and the social Eurozone that has witnessed welfare states’ governance (Grahl and 
Teague, 2013). The future of Germany-Greece debt issue is very controversial, however, 
the EU member countries are working on offering feasible solutions that can help sustain 
the Eurozone. These solutions are offered mainly through the financial support of the 
ECB, the EC and the International Monetary Fund, where are known as the ‘Troika’ 
(Elliott, 2015). The troika applied a “Fiscal Compact” on Greece, Portugal, and 
potentially in Spain. The compact recommended greater control over these states’ fiscal 
policies. Stephen Gill, the distinguished professor at York University, challenges the 
policies of the troika and emphasizes that these proposed neoliberal solutions are the 
main reason behind the crisis. Gill sheds light on how the IMF is controlled by 
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“freemasonry of bankers, who see crisis as an opportunity to deepen neoliberal 
restructuring and to protect financial interests” (Gill, 2011).  
Using the EU as model in this thesis is mainly to benchmark on one of the most 
successful regional integration agreements that was able to increase intra-regional trade 
and establish a regional political and economic block. However, this model has 
significant problems in the neoliberal era that continues to minimize the state’s role and 
advocate for ‘free market’ as the only route to economic growth. Neoliberal 
institutionalism emphasizes that states are the agents of regulating the markets 
imperfections through developing effectual supranational institutions.  One of the most 
success factors of the EU as an integration model is the existence of effective 
supranational institutions, which have ensured the implementation of intergovernmental 
integration agreements. The EU supranational institutions are primarily the European 
Parliament, which serves as the legislative entity, the European Commission and Council, 
which serve as the executive agency, and the European Central Bank (ECB), which 
serves as the economic pillar of the EU (Galal and Hoekman, 2003).  
The growth of the GDPs of the EU member countries was reflected on the amount 
of expenditures on social benefits. After the formation of the EU in 1993, the share of 
social benefits spending increased across all EU member countries, from 38% to an 
average of 45% of total government spending. Germany has recorded the highest among 
all member countries in terms of the share of social benefits with an average of 55.2% of 
the total government spending. The average of other European countries spending on 
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social spending as a share of total spending has been as follows: “Netherlands (49%), 
Sweden (27.9%), Portugal (29.9%), and Denmark (34.7%)” (European Report, 1997).  
Since the 1970s, the EU has established solid rules that have ensured the 
importance of social and human development. In 1974, the European Economic 
Community (EEC) established the Social Action Programme, which developed three 
broad scopes of social development that should be considered across the EU member 
countries in order to ensure sustainable development. The three areas were: 1) attaining 
full employment with better employment schemes across all EC members; 2) improving 
the working and living conditions of workers; 3) enhancing the quality of employees 
mainly through engaging them in the decision making process. Setting these rules is the 
base for a social welfare state that has aligned with the private sector and labour, but with 
a welfare state leadership, a form of tripartite governance (Esping-Anderson, 1999). 
By the 1990s, social laws and policies have also evolved to a more comprehensive 
level that have helped to reduce poverty across the EU member countries, mainly through 
setting relatively balanced minimum wage policies. In fact, these rules were the reason 
behind maintaining a more stable Euro zone, even during the economic recession in 2009 
(Grahl and Teague, 2013). 
2.5 The role of the leader in realizing integration agreements 
 The success of an integration agreement is a factor of the commitment of its 
member states to abide to the agreement’s conditions. This commitment increases with 
the influence exerted by one or more member states, mainly through taking a leadership 
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role that acts for motivating or directing other member states to commit to the 
agreements’ conditions.  This leadership role also extends to shaping better frameworks 
for the performance of supranationalism. In the case of the EU, which despite its 
shortcomings, is our model of a relatively successful integration agreement, Germany 
played a significant role in the formation of   the EU, especially in the early phases of 
economic integration. 
 After the Bretton Woods agreement in July 1944, Germany adopted a pegged 
exchange system to the US dollar. However, by the 1970s, the pegged exchange rate 
system started to fail because of the deficit in the balance of trade that appeared as a 
result of Bretton Woods agreement, where the EU member countries were relatively less 
than their total exports. In March 1973, the foreign governments applied a floating 
exchange rate system, when the US unilaterally ended the conversion of the US dollar to 
gold, thus declaring the end of the Bretton Woods system. The existing floating exchange 
rate system in the EU countries has given the European countries flexibility in the 
decision making of fiscal policies (Hetzel, 2002). 
 The huge deficit in the balance of payments of many European countries, which 
resulted from the deficit in the balance of trade, had urged the European countries to 
increase the scale of European intra-trade. The geographical proximity of European 
countries lowered the transaction costs of intra-trade as opposed to the European 
countries’ trade with the US, thus resulted in a GDP growth for most European member 
states. The greater challenge for the European countries was the stabilization of their 
monetary systems in order to reduce inflation and unemployment. It is worth mentioning 
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that the US was against the bilateral trade agreements among the European countries and 
was advocating for ‘free trade’ since European economic integration would affect the US 
economy negatively in relation to the European countries (Hetzel, 2002). 
Germany was a pioneer in developing a stable monetary system since the creation 
of the Bank Deutscher Lander (BDL) on March 1948, which acted as the central bank of 
Western Germany.  The BDL was able to implement successful monetary policies that 
have resulted in stabilizing the currency in Germany through decreasing inflation. As a 
result, European countries created the European Payments Union (EPU) as a step towards 
currency stability and hindering the impact of inflation that was caused by fixing the 
European currencies exchange rates to the US dollar.  
Additionally, in 1957 Germany established a new central bank, the Bundesbank, 
which replaced the BDL. Bundesbank was responsible for stabilizing the German 
currency by regulating the amount of money in circulation in the economy. Bundesbank, 
through successful monetary policies, played a significant role in reducing inflation and 
unemployment rates. In 1978 Germany was leading the European countries in 
establishing a European Monetary system that increased trade scale among European 
countries and minimized inflation and unemployment rates. In 1978 Germany was 
leading the European countries in establishing a European Monetary system that 
increased trade scale among European countries and minimized inflation and 
unemployment rates (Von Hagen, 1999). 
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By the 1980s, Germany‘s leadership role was becoming more evident in leading 
other European countries towards creating a new, democratic, successful Europe that 
utilizes geographical proximity to increase regional integration. Bundesbank was 
directing the ECB in establishing a regional monetary policy that fostered an environment 
of price stability. The harmonization of trade relationships among the European countries 
has sharpened the vision of the European countries to increase the integration level in 
order to be able to compete with the strong American economy (Von Hagen, 1999). 
European economic integration reached maturity after the Single European Act in 
1986. This act set the base for the establishment of a single market for the European 
Community (EC) that has free movement of the factors of production, namely labour and 
capital. In 1988, the European Council met in Hanover, Germany and developed a plan 
for a single currency (Euro) to be circulated in the Euro area (Hetzel, 2002). In December 
1991, the EU members signed the Treaty on European Union, which laid down 
conditions for a complete economic and monetary integration, mainly through the 
formation of the European Monetary Union and the use of the Euro as a single European 
currency.  
In the case of Arab integration, the EU cannot serve as a simple model to follow. 
There are, however, important lessons to be gained, including the importance of a 
regional leader for achieving effectual integration agreements. Egypt played the role of 
the leader since the development of the Arab League in 1945 till Jamal Abdel Nasser 
presidential era in the 1960s. The notion of Arab integration and Pan-Arabism highly 
evolved during Nasser’s era. ISI policies were implemented to assure the Egyptian state 
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sovereignty through decreasing the dependency on the West. Egypt was leading the 
region due to its economic weight and its role in supporting other states’ to gain their 
dependence from colonialism, for example Algeria against the French colonialism. The 
Arab league premises remained in Egypt till the era of President Anwar ElSadat, who 
was against the inward-looking policies. Sadat didn’t have the vision of developing 
‘dynamic’ comparative advantages that Nasser had. The Egyptian capitalist state during 
Sadat’s regime rushed into open-door policies, which negatively impacted the 
development of infant industries. Additionally, Camp-David peace agreement, which was 
signed during Sadat’s era, was rejected by other Arab states and Egypt was suspended 
from the Arab League from 1979 till 1989. Such act decreased the level of trust between 
other Arab states and Egypt, which negatively impacted integration attempts (Tauber, 
2013). Egypt was no longer considered as the region’s leader.  
Further, scholars argue that leadership criteria should be based on “regional 
economic size”, which is calculated in relation to the total trade of the selected country to 
other countries (Fawzy, 2003). Accordingly, the GCC countries, especially Saudi Arabia, 
could have taken the leadership role towards achieving Arab regional integration. The 
GCC member countries are highly endowed by natural resources, especially oil. 
Petrostates have only gained the economic weight after the discovery of oil in the 1940s 
and have only considered maintaining their oil-export relations with the Northern states, 
especially USA. The petro-states fear of sharing the returns of oil with other non-oil 




USA interests in the Middle East region, especially the gulf, started in the 1930 
with the early discovery of oil in Saudi Arabia. In 1933, the King of Saudi Arabia, 
Abdul-Rahman Alsud, granted an American company, namely Stanford Oil of California 
(SOCAL), which was later named as Chevron, the right to search for oil in Saudi Arabia. 
SOCAL discovered significant amount of oil. In the 1940s SOCAL entered multiple 
consortiums with other American companies to prospect for oil in Saudi Arabia and other 
Gulf countries. SOCAL was renamed the Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO), 
which dominated the oil extraction in Saudi Arabia. The profits of oil where 
proportionally shared between the kingdom and ARAMCO, which was managing the 
contracts of other American companies within the consortium (Oil, n.d.). The Northern 
oil companies, especially those of the US, have been sharing the revenues of oil with 
Arab states since the 1950s and dominating the top-level governance in order to secure 
their geopolitical interests (Hudson, 1999).  
The next chapter will recommend political strategies and practices that can 
facilitate integration attempts. Arab economic integration remains merely a "project", yet, 
the potentiality of Arab integration is significant given the geographic, cultural, and 
sharing a common language, which theoretically can increase intra-regional investment 
and help the movement of skilled labour across the region. EU member states don’t share 
a common language, yet, the results of the study of Wei, Shang-jin, (1996) shows that 
sharing a common language among member states of a regional integration agreement 
can increase the trade volume, especially in the Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) 
(Wei, Shang-jin, 1996).  
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Nevertheless, the lack of effective supranational institutions, which can 
effectively govern and enforce integration agreements, has contributed to the failure of 
many Arab integration agreements. Smaller Arab countries were not compensated by rich 
Arab countries in previous integration agreements. Accordingly, Arab countries have lost 
economic and political incentives that can entice them towards more effective integration 
processes (Galal and Hoekman, 1997).  
Additionally, Arab countries are suffering from low degrees of openness, which 
hinders intra-Arab trade, which can be enhanced regionally through effectual integration. 
Average tariff rates in Arab countries are higher when compared to other regions in Asia 
or Europe (Zarrouk, 1998). Unlike neoclassical economists, who argue that trade 
liberalization and sudden removal of tariffs is the only route to effectual trade relation, I 
argue that the state can decide to remove tariffs only after reaching a level of production 
maturity that results from the development of “dynamic” comparative advantages by the 
state (see Lin and Chang, 2009; Choudhary, 2013). Joseph Stiglitz, the well-known 
economist, emphasizes that states are responsible for developing their resources not only 
on the short scale for commodities that have existing comparative advantages but also 
sectors that can grow and get developed over decades. The concept of comparative 
advantage was introduced by the economist David Ricardo, who developed the theory of 
comparative advantage in 1817. Ricardo argues that a country’s economic gains of trade 
will increase, when engaging in international trade, as it focuses on exporting goods for 
which it has more efficiency in production (Suranovic, 2010). Stiglitz sheds light on 
South Korea, which had a comparative advantage in growing rice in the 1950s and was 
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able to invest in the electronics and automotives sector. Stiglitz highlights that what 
actually matters is the “dynamic comparative advantage”, which can take decades to 
develop but is capable of achieving economic growth rates that existing comparative 
advantages cannot achieve (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 2006).  
Ha-Joon Chang, the well known South-Korean economist, agree with Stiglizt on 
how South Korea was able to achieve its economic growth through ‘defying’ the existing 
comparative advantages and exploring the sectors that can be developed through state-
centric economic support, for examples subsidies. Chang emphasizes that the United 
States of America (USA) has been subsidizing its core agricultural and technological 
sectors (Chang, 2008). Chang also emphasizes the importance of state intervention to 
protect infant industries so that they can develop to a level of maturity and compete in 
global markets. Chang provides multiple examples to explain his argument about 
‘Comparative Advantage Defying’ (CAD), such as Toyota automobile company in Japan 
which was subsidized for 30 years before being profitable. Justin Lin, the well-known 
Chinese economist and Senior Vice president of the World Bank, agrees with Chang on 
the role of the state in protecting infant industries and developing comparative 
advantages. However, Lin disagrees with Chang on the CAD concept and calls for 
another approach, which he calls ‘Comparative Advantage Following’ (CAF). 
 According to Lin, CAF is a progressive development of sectors that has 
comparative advantage, for example, developing motorcycles industry into car industry. 
CAF is a calculated investment that has less risk than the CAD (Lin and Chang, 2009). 
Lin also disagrees with Chang on the ‘scope and scale’ of state intervention, where Lin 
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argues that protectionism should be for those sectors that have a calculated market 
acceptance. Also the state has to select the most competitive sectors so as not to devastate 
the economic resources and capital on losing sectors. Lin provides examples to debunk 
Chang’s argument, such as the Malaysian tires industry which was subsidized for 20 
years and was not able to take off.  
Lin’s view point acknowledges capitalism as a dominating global system, yet, he 
emphasizes that states must interfere to correct market imperfections, such tax evasions, 
monopolistic moves, and labour exploitation, and develop ‘dynamic comparative 
advantages. These ideologies are the core concepts of ‘neoliberal institutionalism’, which 
agrees with intergovernmentalism on the centrality of the state’s role in the economy. 
However, neoliberal institutionalism provides a better understanding of economic and 
political relations between states and not just national governments that might change. 
Both CAD and CAF require a rigid state-centric approach that is backed by solid 
institutional and supranational frameworks (Keohane, 1984).  
Additionally, tariff revenues contribute to Arab countries’ GDPs. In fact, the high 
tariffs revenue makes it undesirable for Arab countries to integrate because reducing 
tariffs with other Arab states in a given integration agreement will result in a loss of tariff 
revenues (Hoekman and Messerlin, 2002). This share of the state GDP should be 
replaced by incremental intra-Arab trade that accrue as a results of creating and 
developing “dynamic” comparative advantages.  
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In conclusion, theorizing integration agreements from a neoliberal institutional 
perspective provides a comprehensive and robust understanding of the complexity of 
agreements given the global capital system. The state plays a significant role in 
developing the economy through utilizing the state resources and regulating the private 
sector’s operations towards a real effective development of the state. The state has to set 
the legislative and institutional structure that helps promote developing human 
capabilities, mainly through setting labour laws and provisioning the social needs of 
people, such as education and healthcare. The improvement in a given sector is not 
achieved through a “spillover effect” but can only be realized through a state-driven 
approach, which plans and manage the needed resources, both labour and capital. 
Theorizing Arab integration must acknowledge that states shape the agreements. 
Non-state institutions, primarily the private sector can enhance integration agreements 
through increasing the scale of trade among member states, yet, the state has to govern 
the operations of the private sector in a way that protects and develops the economic 
agenda, which should be a tool towards human development not only GDP growth. The 
Arabic-based private sector investments in the Middle East, however, are minimal 
compared to other Northern multinational conglomerates. The small scale of the Arabic 
private sector has achieved minimal results towards increasing integration efforts in the 
Middle East (Arab Monetary Fund, 2015). 
 Achieving political and economic security has been a stated goal in all Arab 
integration attempts, yet, lacking supranational institutions, control and audit integration 
agreements has been a main reason behind the failure of all previously mentioned Arab 
48 
 
integration attempts. Arab integration model can draw significant lessons from the EU 
model, especially in having a vision for a prosperous region as opposed to short term 
economic gains. The EU also sets the base for Arab countries to understand integration 
through a human development lens, where the economic gains are utilized to develop 
human capabilities. The next chapter will provide a comprehensive review of Arab 
integration politics and will analyze the role of Arab leaders in leading integration 
agreements given the lack of political and economic incentives, which mainly stems from 













3. Chapter 3: Arab integration Politics 
3.1 A Brief History of Arab Integration Attempts 
Scholars argue that the “formation of a united Arab economic bloc would 
strengthen the bargaining power of the region in an increasingly polarized world and 
offer its people the opportunity to achieve a better standard of living” (Galal and 
Hoekman, 2003). Arab integration attempts historically have varied from bilateral trade 
agreements aiming at reducing tariffs on certain commodities to ambitious agreements on 
achieving an Arab common market. In 1953 Egypt, Lebanon, and Jordan signed the 
“Agreement on Trade facilitation & Regulating Transit Trade". In 1964, Egypt, Jordan, 
Syria, and Iraq signed the “Arab Common Market Agreement”, which aimed at trade 
liberalization through forming a free trade area. In 1981, the member states of the Arab 
league signed the “Agreement for Facilitation and Promotion of intra-Arab Trade”, which 
aimed at the elimination of tariffs and non-tariff barriers on manufactured commodities 
among member states.  
The 1980s witnessed smaller-scale sub-regional agreements, namely the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC), which was established by Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The GCC was more successful in increasing 
intra-regional trade than the Arab Cooperation Council (ACC), which aimed at achieving 
trade liberalization among member states, since it was able in having intergovernmental 
agreement that aimed at reaching an advanced level of integration, namely a GCC custom 
union (Younis, 2010).  The ACC was signed between Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and Yemen. 
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Additionally, in 1989, the Maghreb Arab Union was established by Algeria, Libya, 
Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia. Finally, in 1997, the Arab League endorsed the 
GAFTA, which represents a modification of the “The agreement on facilitation and 
development of Trade”, which was an agreement signed by eighteen member countries of 
the Arab League in 1981 aiming at promoting intra-Arab trade (Galal and Hoekman, 
2003). 
Arab economic integration exists primarily on paper, yet, current changes in the 
world dynamics, especially the rise of the South, and especially emerging economic 
leaders like Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, or the BRICS, against US 
economic hegemony is urging Arab states to respond to these global changes (UNDP, 
2013). Arab countries need to develop their bilateral and multilateral trade agreements in 
a way that maximizes their economic gains, which are extensively shaped through geo-
political relations with the US. Arab countries have strong relations with the US rooted in 
the geo-politics of oil, however, developing a solid agricultural and industrial base is 
crucial for the sustainability of Arab economic growth, especially with the vulnerability 
of oil as the largest sector of Arab economic growth. Arab states need to integrate to 
increase the scale of Arab investments, which is known as “investment creation” in order 
to facilitate the growth of these agricultural and industrial bases (see Dunning and 
Robson, 1998; Fernandez, 1997; Dee and Gali, 2003). Achieving an effectual Arab 
integration agreement can also increase Arab negotiation power on the international 
levels (see Heimenz and Langhammer, 1990). For example, the EU member countries 
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collectively were able to achieve better trade deals with the US than what each country 
individually would have achieved (Hosny, 2013). 
In fact, the current political unrest in the Middle East region in Iraq and Egypt in 
addition to the civil wars that have evolved after the Arab spring in 2011 in some Arab 
countries such as Syria, Libya, and Yemen can challenge the possibility of future 
integration results. However, the Prime Minster of Egypt, Ibrahim Mehleb, emphasize 
that trade relation are partially affected but the chambers of commerce in most Arab 
countries are working on improving trade relations and stabilizing the economic 
performance of the region. This was evident in the Economic Development Conference 
hosted by Egypt on the 13-15
th
 March, 2015. The conference has witnessed the presence 
of all Arab countries governmental officials, consulting experts, and more than 1,700 
investors (Shenker, 2015, March 15). A recent study by Alex Braithwaite, Jeffrey Kucik, 
and Jessica Maves shows that there are costs of political unrest. Governments fall but 
states will remain and Arab states can shape long term goals that can lead to economic 
prosperity post political unrest period (Braithwaite, Kucik, & Maves, 2014).  
Analyzing the legacy of Arab integration, with a special focus on the GAFTA 
since it has entailed the largest number of Arab countries that share ambitious integration 
goals, can be the starting point of raising Arab integration from the ashes. This chapter 
will provide a comprehensive review of Arab integration history and will examine the 
politics of integration among these countries in order to pave the road for “deep 
integration”. The term deep integration was introduced by Robert Lawrence, where he 
differentiated between “deep integration” and “shallow integration”, where shallow 
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integration refers to the case where only tariffs are removed, while other non-tariff 
barriers remain to hinder the progress of integration efforts (Lawrence, 1997). Achieving 
“deep integration” removes the bureaucratic non-tariff barriers and enforces laws and 
policies that are governed by supranational institutions. These policies may include, but 
are not limited to, tax policies, competition policies, and labour standards (Ehtier, 1998). 
The removal of tariffs as a trade condition should be applied only for Arab states in order 
to enhance Pan-Arabism as a step towards improving the economic performance of the 
region. This expected increase in trade relations among Arab countries acts as a 
“preparation” phase so that Arab markets can compete when opened to a more advanced 
level of competition with the northern and global markets (Zorob, 2008).  
Arab shallow integration attempts were evident in the removal of tariff barriers 
among member states acts as the first phase towards economic integration. The removal 
of non-tariff barriers acts as the next step towards deep integration, which will only 
happen through a shared vision among Arab states to build their dynamic comparative 
advantages. For example, the free movement of labour can enhance transferring expertise 
among Arab nations. This prescription of achieving deep integration does not ignore the 
current situation of failing integration attempts among Arab countries. This thesis aims at 
highlighting some recommendations that can be utilized by Arab decision makers in the 
long term. The low complementarity index among Arab nations can be enhanced through 
developing other non-oil sectors, mainly industrial and agricultural (Saidi, 2003). States, 
not the private sector, can deploy this vision both on the short and long terms.  
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The removal of tariff barrier is also conditional upon reaching a level of maturity 
that allows products to compete globally. Lin agrees with Ha-Joon Chang on the state’s 
role in protecting infant industries. However, the two economists disagree on the duration 
and scope of protectionism. Lin argues that protectionism should only be granted to the 
sector that has the potential to grow and can match with Stiglitz’s definition of dynamic 
comparative advantage. Such strategic planning avoids scattering the state’s resources on 
sector that have no future growth potential or market acceptance. While Chang argues 
that Japan continued to fund Toyota car industry for 30 years before becoming profitable, 
Lin debunks Chang’s viewpoint using the Malaysian tire industries that didn’t manage to 
take off. Lin emphasizes that gradual removal of tariff barriers can improve industrial 
quality through competitiveness (Lin and Chang, 2009). In fact, removing intra-Arab 
barriers can help increase the existing limited scale of intra-trade that barely reaches 7%.  
The Arab league, which is a regional organization that aims at governing the 
economic and political relations of Arab states, has lead the Arab integration attempts 
since its establishment in 1945.  The Arab league established its “Economic Council”, 
which aimed at achieving Pan-Arab trade relationships, which were highly influenced by 
the inward-oriented economic policies in the 1960s and 70s (Romagnoli and Mengoni, 
2009). The expected increase in intra-trade should act for increasing the production 





3.2 Factors favouring Arab integration 
There are several factors that, in theory, should or could increase the likelihood of 
integration in the Middle East region, such as having a common language, which is the 
Arabic language. Having a common language in a region reduces the transactional costs, 
such as negotiations, formulating contracts, and managing trade data (Wei, Shang-jin, 
1996). The geographic proximity of Arab countries can help increase intra-Arab trade 
volumes due to lowering transaction and transportation costs.  
Moreover, Arab countries share a number of common characteristics that can 
increase their regional integration, such as common culture, history and ethnic traditions. 
The colonial history of Arab countries, for example Egypt, Algeria, and Morocco, has 
generated common political needs for Arab states to develop their economic bases after 
years of dependency on the North. These colonial regimes had exploited the resources of 
their colonies, which were ‘cursed’ by these resources as they were the main reason 
behind being colonized by European countries, namely Britain and France (Saidi, 2003). 
3.3 Factors against Arab integration 
One of the major problems that hinder Arab economic integration is the high 
contribution of tariff revenues to the total revenues for most of the countries of the Arab 
region, except the large oil producing countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The 
loss of tariff revenues can negatively impact the economies of smaller countries in the 
region. Accordingly, the compensation of weaker countries necessitates the existence of 
supranational institutions that can effectually minimize the short-term negative 
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implications of regional integration. This loss of tariff revenues can also be compensated 
through other tax alternatives such as income tax, general sales tax, or the optimization of 
governmental subsidies (Saidi, 2003). However, I argue that Arab countries should 
reduce the dependence on tariff revenues and increase intra-regional trade, which is a 
more sustainable tool of growth that also helps to solve unemployment problems. 
Additionally, Arab countries are competing on the same export markets since they 
are producing relatively similar export products, such as chemicals and oil products. Arab 
countries trade volumes are low because of the high similarity of production patterns, 
which is known as the complementarity index, which is an index that varies from zero to 
one hundred, the higher the value of the index the more likely the regional integration is 
to succeed. The similarity of production patterns of Arab states stems from the colonial 
history, especially in the North African Arab states, such as Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria and 
Morocco. Colonized Arab states’ economies were mainly shaped according to the 
agricultural and industrial needs of Britain and France, such as cotton in Egypt, citrus 
products in Iraq, and silk textiles in Lebanon, which negatively impacted the 
development of the needed economic sectors (Hudson, 1999). This similarity in 
production structure is limiting the expected outcomes of integration agreements, where 
member countries take advantage of the difference in natural endowments and achieve 
better trade creation based on developing dynamic comparative advantages of each Arab 
country that has to be shared within a regional vision (Hoekman and Messerlin, 2002). 




Complementarity Index between Arab Countries (Each country listed in relation to other Arab 
Countries) 
Bahrain 17.4 Lebanon 34.4 Qatar 13.6 
Egypt 28 Yemen 5.9 Saudi Arabia 13.2 
Jordan 25.5 Libya 8.5 Syria 16.8 
Kuwait 9.6 Oman 25.6 UAE 20.6 
Source: Yeats and Francis (2000).  
The GAFTA complementarity index is low. Accordingly, future integration 
agreements should consider non-oil exports, especially chemicals and agricultural 
commodities, in order to build a sustainable agricultural and industrial base aside from 
the vulnerable oil sector.  Michael Hudson emphasizes that there is an “Arab disease 
analogous to the Dutch disease,” which happened in Holland in the 1940s after the 
discovery of natural gas, where Holland became highly dependent on the natural gas 
sector. Hudson emphasizes that Holland is endowed by natural resources, fertile land, and 
a “European infrastructure and market”, unlike the Arab states who ore mainly dependant 
on oil exports. In fact, the heavy dependence on oil has reduced the Arab states incentives 
to "has reduced Arab incentives to diversify their economies, develop alternative 
manufacturing capacities, promote export–oriented industries, encourage domestic 
savings, and anchor income on solid productivity grounds” (Hudson, 1999, p. 20). Gulf 
countries before the 1930s had very primitive economies that mainly depend on the 
export of food commodities. For example, Saudi Arabia was mainly dependant on date 
and animal exports, meanwhile, United Arab Emirates was mainly specialized in fishing 
and pearl industry (United Arab Emirates Profile, 2015). After the discovery of oil in the 
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Gulf region, these countries became significantly dependant on oil as the main 
contributor to their exports and GDP (WITS, 2015). While acknowledging that the 
existing trade portfolio and complementarity indices challenges the possibility of any 
‘real’ economic integration, this thesis questions the long term implications of Arab trade 
that needs developing ‘dynamic’ comparative advantages, which would take decades to 
develop. Unless Arab states, especially the GCC members, develop non-oil agricultural 
and industrial bases, these countries will start suffering severe economic problems after 
years of ‘oil-prosperity’. Developing an alternative route that prioritize trade flows 
among Arab states will be conducted in the next chapter, which will analyze the Arab 
trade flows using the UNComtrade data and the World Bank’s database.  
The Arab region can start utilizing the oil funds towards improving the 
agricultural sector in some Arab countries, for example Morocco and Egypt, meanwhile 
starting industrial sector in others such as machinery and transportation industries in 
United Arab Emirates. These investments are usually financed through regional Foreign 
Direct Investments (FDIs). These FDIs should increase the economic welfare of both 
donor and recipient countries and considered a step towards deeper forms of integration 
mainly through increasing the labour movements across the Arab region’s countries 
(Nayar, 2003).  
It is worth mentioning that Arab states got their independence in the period of 
1950-1970, however, colonialism has negatively impacted the development of their 
infrastructure, thus hindering the effectiveness of Arab integration. Arab countries have 
an inadequate infrastructure, which is needed to serve trade needs. According to Nasser 
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Saidi (2003), “Arab countries have underdeveloped transport (air, road and rail), energy 
(oil, gas, and electricity), water, and information and communications networks”. Sharing 
the costs and expected outcomes of these infrastructures also need supranational 
governance (Saidi, 2003, p. 15). 
3.4 The Problems with Arab Supranationalism 
Unlike the EU, where integration policies have been governed by effective 
supranational institutions that have facilitated European integration, Arab countries have 
been lacking effective Supranationalism. The inefficiency of Arab supranationalism 
stems from the lack of specialization that stems from the limited number of employees 
working within Arab supranational institutions. For example, the Arab League with all its 
agencies only has 400 employees, meanwhile, the EU has more than 20,000 employees in 
its main premises in Brussels (Hudson, 1999). Arab countries need a reform of Arab 
supranational institutions in a way that can properly govern the execution of integration 
agreement conditions, either through developing the existing institutions or establishing 
new specialized subsidiaries, which mainly focus on the legislative and economic rules of 
integration.  Arab corrupted leaders have benefited from their trade relations with the US, 
especially Saudi Arabia that exports 25% of its oil to USA (WITS, 2015), and Egypt that 
is highly dependent on the US-aid (Momani, 2003).  
Arab leaders had no real intentions to develop these institutions since the 
corrupted regimes has neglected all social movements that have aimed for real changes, 
including the development of internal or regional governing institutions, such as the Arab 
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League (Hudson, 1999).  For example, in Egypt, the “presidential monarch” in Egypt, 
which was significantly apparent since Sadat’s era, whose “overriding goal was to remain 
in power, and to this end granted many privileges to his “court”, made up of a composite 
state bourgeoisie, stemming from and/or having strong ties to the private sector” 
(Djoufelkit-Cottenet, 2008, p. 16). Mubarak’s regime was also famous for the 
“businessmen ministers”, who were actual rent seekers and abusing the legislative 
institutions and the parliament to serve their capitalist needs and ignoring the demands of 
the people. The continuity of those corrupted leader would destroy any real 
developmental or Arab integration efforts (Arafat, 2009). The future of the Arab region 
post the Arab Spring is unpredictable given the current the political unrest, however, 
some scholars would argue that the level of corruption has decreased since the level of 
transparency in disseminating national budgets increased after the Arab Spring.  
However, after the military coup in Egypt, Arwa Hassan, the Senior Programme 
Coordinator in Transparency International’s Middle East and North Africa department, 
emphasizes that the current military regime is back to using the “strong-arm tactics of the 
deposed dictatorship” which doesn’t lead to the targeted real developmental change 
(Hasan, 2011). It is worth mentioning that social movements and welfare-state 
development in the EU took decades since 1800s until yielded the democratic regimes 
governing nowadays (Esping-Anderson, 1999). The dictatorship regimes in the Arab 
world are challenging the potentiality of Arab integration since state development needs 
social reforms that can establish democratic frameworks that can ensure the equality or 
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balance of the gains of the economic returns of integration, which are monopolized by 
corrupted rulers.  
Nevertheless, there were some attempts to achieve ‘real’ Pan-Arabism, especially 
in the 1970s and before the peace era after the signature of Camp-David peace treaty in 
1978, such as the foundation of the Arab Monetary Fund (AMF), which has worked for 
correcting the balance of payment of member countries and promoting intra-Arab trade 
(Arab Monetary Fund, 2015). The AMF has been the main organization endorsing pan-
Arab regional planning and integration through developing the Joint Arab Economic 
Action (JAEA) in the Arab Summit in Amman in 1980 (ESCWA, 2001).  
The benefits of regional integration have been apparent to scholars and policy 
makers, yet, the limitations towards Arab integration agreements have enticed sub-
regional agreements to develop and become more successful than larger-scale integration 
agreements. One of the relatively successful Arab sub-regional integration agreements is 
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which was formulated in 1981 by Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and Oman. Bessma Momani (2007) 
emphasizes that the GCC member states have “significantly increased nominal 
intraregional trade”. The GCC member states were successful in establishing a well 
performing custom union and have planned for a common currency (Momani, 2007b). In 
fact, the GCC’s relative success, when compared to other Arab integration attempts, 
stems from a political vision that views the importance of integration to form a strategic 
negotiation block with international institutions and also having regional security, 
especially after the Iraq-Iran War in 1980 (“Success of GCC union”, 2012). Saudi Arabia 
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has played a major role in the success of the GCC, especially in setting the rules for 
military cooperation between the six member states to ensure security and establishing 
solid rules for economic cooperation and developing sub-regional infrastructure (Abdulla, 
1999). In fact, the security of the GCC has been a major concern to the US, which has 
strategic interests in the oil of gulf countries (Hudson, 1999). 
Another short-term, sub-regional integration agreement that was expected by the 
Arab Economic Council to be as successful as the GCC was the Arab Cooperation 
Council (ACC), which was founded in 1989 by Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and Yemen. The 
ACC agreement was terminated after the second Gulf War in 1991, when Egypt joined 
the US-led allied forces and entered the war against Iraq (Zorob, 2008). It is worth 
mentioning that larger scale agreements increase the benefits of member countries via 
increasing regional resource access and regional market size for all member states. This 
argument necessitates a vision that develops ‘dynamic’ comparative advantage based on 
speculating the market acceptance and growth of the region, which is currently lacked by 
the contemporary Arab region. Effective integration that balances the political and 
economic gains of integration should enhance the industrial base of all member states. 
Trade creation among member states should also have a positive “production and 
consumption effect” across member states, mainly through reducing the costs of 
consumer products and enlarging middle class markets (Hosny, 2013). 
The existence of the GCC as a part of the GAFTA agreement was also increasing 
the success potentials of the GAFTA (Abedini and Péridy, 2007).The success of the EU 
was relatively correlated with the number of countries that joined the EU, where the 
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increase of member countries has positively impacted the EU results. Thus, renegotiating 
the GAFTA, with its 18 member states, can positively change the future of Arab 
integration. 
3.5 Why the GAFTA? 
 After the Gulf War, Madrid Peace Conference was held to discuss the future of 
the Arab region. Madrid Conference was followed by the Oslo Accord Conference in 
Norway in 1993. The meeting was attended by all Arab countries, EU countries 
representatives, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, and the US officials, who were 
headed by the US president Bill Clinton. The Oslo meetings seriously discussed the 
potentiality of a “New Middle East”, which was the name of the book written by the 
former Israeli Prime Minister Shemon in 1993. Peris (1993) argues for a peaceful Middle 
East that has more intra-trade relations. Arab countries seriously discussed the possibility 
of effective integration in the three economic summits held in Casablanca in 1994, 
Amman in 1995, and Cairo in 1996. Arab states discussed the formation of an Arab Free 
Trade Area, named the GAFTA in 1997, and the development of a Regional Bank for 
development, which was established, in Cairo, in March 1996 (Tibi, 1999). The success 
of the EU in the 1990s, mainly in increasing intra-EU trade, has also motivated the Arab 
states to sign the GAFTA agreement in order to enhance Arab intra-trade (Younes, 2010).  
Additionally, US officials pushed for trade liberalization in “New Middle East”. 
The Congress recommended increasing trade relations with the Arab countries. In the 
1990s, the Congress has advocated for “trade not aid” as the rationale of the US-Egypt 
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relations. It is worth mentioning that Egypt has been the second recipient of the US aid 
after Israel since the signature of Camp David Peace agreement, where Egypt has been 
receiving annually around 2 billion dollars (Momani, 2003). The US has been keen on 
maintaining its influence on Saudi Arabia and Egypt, which are the two key players in the 
GAFTA agreement, in order to secure its strategic needs in the region, such as securing 
the access to oil, maintaining Arab-Israel peace relations, and having an access to the 
Arab large consumer markets. In fact, The EU was competing with the US, in the early 
phases of the GAFTA, on shaping multilateral trade agreements with Arab states to 
ensure access to Arab markets (Tibi, 1999). 
In 1997, Middle East states signed a regional integration agreement that was the 
largest in relation to the number of member states. The GAFTA has been aiming at 
achieving a pan-Arab free trade zone, mainly through eliminating tariffs on manufactured 
and agricultural commodities by 10% annually over a ten-year period (Momani, 2007a). 
The GAFTA has been signed by 18 member countries: Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, 
Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, the United 
Arab Emirates, Algeria, Palestine, Yemen, and Jordan. The GAFTA also has four 
“candidate countries,” which have not yet joined the agreement, namely Comoros, 
Djibouti, Mauritania, and Somali. The GAFTA was considered a trial to effectively 
revive the "Agreement to Facilitate and Develop Trade Among Arab Countries", which 
was signed in 1981 and governed by the Arab League’s Economic and Social Council. 
The GAFTA was developed with the essence of the Economic Unity agreement, 
which was signed on June 3, 1957. This agreement states clearly the targets for Arab 
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integration between the members of the Arab league, which are to “organize and 
consolidate economic relations among the States of the Arab League on bases that are 
consistent with the natural and historical among them; and to provide the best conditions 
for flourishing their economies, developing their resources and ensuring the prosperity of 
their countries” (The Economic Unity Agreement, 2003). These strong words only exist 
on papers and the future of ‘consolidating economic relations’ will only come to action 
through developing other non-oil sectors, which needs an implementation of Stiglitz’s 
vision of ‘dynamic’ comparative advantage.  
The basis of intra-Arab economic relations are outlined in articles one and two of 
the first chapter of the ‘Economic Unity Agreement’, with the first article emphasizing 
the free exchange of goods and products, enhancing trade logistics through the 
optimization of usage of ports and airports, and promoting labour mobility among 
member countries. Article 2 sets the targets towards an effective Arab economic region 
through accomplishing the following:  
1. “Merging their countries into a single customs area subject to a unified administration, 
and unification of customs' tariffs, legislation and regulations that are applied in each of 
them.  
2. Unification of import-export policies and regulations.  
3. Unification of transport and transit regulations.  
4. Concluding jointly trade and payments agreements with other countries.  
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5. Co-ordination of policies related to agriculture, industry, and internal trade; and 
unification of economic legislation in a manner that would guarantee equivalent 
conditions for all nationals of the contracting countries working in agriculture, industry, 
and other professions.  
6. Co-ordination of labor and social security legislation.  
7. a. Co-ordination of legislation concerning government and municipal taxes and duties 
and all taxes pertaining to agriculture, industry, trade, real estate, and capital investments 
in a manner ensuring equivalent opportunities.  
b. Avoidance of double taxation of nationals of the contracting parties.  
8. Co-ordination of monetary and fiscal policies and regulations in preparation for the 
unification of currencies of the contracting parties.  
9. Unification of statistical methods of classification and tabulations.  
10. Adoption of any other measures that are necessary for the achievement of the goals 
specified in Articles (1) and (2)”. 
Source: (The Economic Unity Agreement, 2003). Retrieved, on March, 7, 2015, from 
http://www.cris.unu.edu/riks/web/treaties/constituent_treaties/19._The_Economic_Unity_Agreement_Amo
ng_States_the_Arab_League_establishing_the__Council_of_Arab_EconomicXX3June1957.pdf 
Achieving the 10 articles that are listed in article 2 has been the core agreement of 
the GAFTA, which has sought to address the liberalization of trade in industrial and 
agricultural commodities, where the agreement has set the base for the periodical removal 
of tariffs as well as non-tariff barriers, mainly quotas. The GAFTA agreement has also 
aimed at achieving “inter-Arab consultation”, especially in the areas of research and 
technological cooperation (Saidi, 2003). It is worth highlighting that trade liberalization 
is the not sole the target of trade relations. In fact, states should protect their infant 
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industries that have competitive and comparative advantage until they are able to 
compete in the global markets. On the other hand, protectionism should be for 
developmental reasons in order not to lose production efficiency, effectiveness, and 
quality (Lin, 2009). Trade liberalization in the GAFTA is also granted for Arab states in 
order to promote intra-trade relations. Preferential terms of trade or the ‘compensation 
schemes’ were applied in the GAFTA, where member states can exclude a list of items of 
trade liberalization or have a gradual decrease of a time period, which was ten years in 
the case of the GAFTA.  According to the agreement, the second step after removing 
intra-Arab tariffs is the formation of the Arab custom union that has a ‘unification of 
customs’ tariffs for non-Arab members (The Economic Unity Agreement, 2003). 
The intraregional trade among the GAFTA members was low compared to the 
expected volumes of trade within the region or when compared to other regional 




Intraregional trade as share of total 




Source: (NAFTA: Statistics, 2014) 
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The GAFTA, thus far, has not been able to achieve ‘real’ integration results, as 
the agreement was limited to liberalization of merchandise trade, where member states 
reduced their tariffs gradually by 10 percent of the existing tariff structure over ten-year 
period. The agreement has given exception on seasonal agricultural fruits and vegetables 
in order to develop the agricultural sector across GAFTA member states (Zorob, 2008).  
The GAFTA was able to achieve zero tariff level by 2005. However, the GAFTA has 
been unable to achieve ‘deep integration’ that can address the removal of non-tariff 
barriers or the creation of a common market, which includes both merchandise and 
services. Additionally, the contribution of non-oil exports to the total exports of the Arab 
countries is very low. For example, in 2003, the total Arab non-oil exports valued 80 
billion USD, which were equivalent to the exports of Finland, a country of 5.4 million 
people. The price volatility of oil and oil products is one of the factors that have 
contributed to the instability and low growth rates of Arab states (Saidi, 2003). This lack 
of diversity in production bases can be developed if Arab states developed their 
comparative advantages, which will be analyzed in this chapter as a future 
recommendation to decision makers in the Arab region.  
The GAFTA was aiming at liberalization of commodities, achieving a 
harmonization of the rules of origin, and unification of rules within the GAFTA members 
regarding production standards, safeguards, and competition policies. Intra-GAFTA 
tariffs are reduced on paper in 2005, however, other NTBs still exist that have blocked 
the actual implementation of the GAFTA agreement. The GAFTA calls all member states 
to conclude mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) in order to achieve the targeted 
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harmonization related to custom clearance procedures and to adopt international 
standards for quality control. In fact “MRAs tend to reduce costs of imports by 
eliminating duplicative product testing and certification in both the exporting and 
importing markets” (Zarrouk and Zalio, 2000, p. 12). The GAFTA has allowed an 
“exemption list” per country that excludes certain products that are either domestic infant 
industries or imports that might compete with these domestic products.  
Nevertheless, the actual agricultural and production bases of Arab countries 
remain very primitive when compared to European countries although the GDP per capita 
in some Arab countries, mainly the Gulf countries are higher than other EU countries. For 
example the GDP per capita of Qatar is USD 145,000, meanwhile the GDP per capita of 
England is USD 45,000 (World Bank, 2015). Intra-arab trade relations are low due to the 
existing industrial and agricultural primitive portfolios. The oil returns should be 
reinvested across the region in order to establish the agricultural and industrial bases, 
which should be the selected dynamic comparative advantages of the region, which will 
be recommended in this chapter per country.  
 
The limitations of the GAFTA are not just in the shallow integration but are the 
absence of a deep integration vision that can allow the effective implementation of the 
short term shallow integration or tariff removals. For example, there are some NTBS that 
still block the implementation of the agreement such as the border rules of some countries 
that might refuse the visa issuance of some labour, mainly those working on road 
transportation (Zarrouk and Zalio, 2000). Deeper integration would allow better FDIs 
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applications across the region and better movement of skilled labour that can solve 
unemployment issues and enhance regional productivity (Zorob, 2008). 
 
3.6 Arab Petro-States and its impact on Arab integration 
Assessing the current trade profiles of Arab countries shows the significant 
dependency of the GCC member countries on oil exports as a percentage of their GDP. 
The income disparity between the rich GCC petro-states and other GAFTA members 
such as Lebanon, Jordon and Morocco, is hindering the progress towards effective 
integration. The petro-state thesis was introduced by Terry Lynn Karl, in her book “The 
Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States”, where she identifies how the actions of 
petro-states can be impacted by the economic motives of maintaining oil returns 
exclusively (Karl, 1997). It is worth mentioning that the GDP per capita in some oil 
exporting Arab countries, for example United Arab Emirates, is 100 times than other 
economically weaker ones, such as Yemen, where the GDP per capita of UAE is 43,000 
USD, whereas the GDP per capita in Yemen is only  1,400 USD (World Bank, 2015). 
This GDP disparity raises the same economic and political fears among weaker Arab 
states that the benefits of integration will be mainly captured by stronger states (Fawzy, 
2003). 
Mineral fuels exports in Kuwait represent 94% of the total exports. Saudi Arabia 
fuel exports also contribute around 88% of the country’s GDP. However, United Arab 
Emirates (UAE) has worked on developing their dynamic comparative advantage since 
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the 1960s, especially in the transportation machinery sector, where its dependency on oil 
exports decreased from 70% to less than 45% in 2013 (WITS, 2015). UAE has utilized 
the incremental GDP growth, which was mainly generated from oil exports toward the 
development of other industries. UAE oil exports are relatively low when compared with 
other Gulf countries since the UAE has established a strong industrial base that assures 
sustainable economic growth as opposed to the vulnerable oil sector. Table 3 shows the 
trade profile of the GCC countries and the contribution of oil as a percentage of the 













103 5,064 96,744 1,651 97,258 158,390 
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13,868 11,367 40,703 335 195,354 395,734 









224,357 157,792 141,104 61,511 607,000 1,411,233 
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Source: (WITS, 2015) 
The above figures, particularly the percentage of oil exports to total exports, shed 
light on the disaster that might face the Arab region when the oil reserves run out. The 
overall Arab regional economic performance is relatively poor since the average growth 
rate of Arab countries ranges between 1 to 2 percent (Lee and Gohar, 2010). 
Additionally, over the past three decades, the economic growth rates of Arab countries 
have fluctuated dramatically, where the average economic growth among Arab countries 
have ranged from –6 % to a significant positive growth that reached 8%, which was 
mainly the growth rate of oil-exporting countries in the 1980s (Noland and Pack, 2007). 
Food and live 
animals 













10,809,295 59,210,654 19,670,057 37,614,826 206,807,129 77,661,039 
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129,696 122,579 199,471 68,600 991,805 5,419,692 
Total trade in 
1000 USD  
13,664,634 62,688,331 24,686,084 42,019,933 234,825,332 151,018,420 
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Oil dependent Arab states also witness a high level of inequality and poverty, 
when compared to European countries that have the same levels of GDP per capita, due 
to the concentration on the oil sector and neglecting the development of other non-oil 
sectors (Kennedy, 2014). In fact, the oil extraction industry, especially in the gulf region, 
is a capital-intensive segment that is mainly managed and operated by foreign labour, 
where “the product of prior choices made mostly outside these countries, about how 
mining industries should be organized” (Karl, 1997, p. 47). Table 4 shows the labour 
force structure in the Gulf region.  
 
Table 4 
  Public Sector Private sector % Non-nationals 













Bahrain  149,868 38,028 496,090 400,482 25.4 80.7 
Kuwait  439, 204 129, 787 1,314,800 1,225,492 29.6 93.2 
Oman  378,335 27,522 1,362,118 1,190,300 7.3 87.4 
Qatar 161,748 92,420 1,039,541 1,026,056 57.1 98.7 
Saudi 
Arabia  
             
3,034, 201 
113,984 8,487,533 7,352,900 3.8 86.6 
Total               
4,163,356 
401,741 12,700,082 11,195,230 9.6 88.2 
Source: Gulf research center, 2014 
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This table shows that national employees represent a very small percentage of the 
total labour force in the Gulf countries, which, as a group are witnessing an increase in 
the unemployment rates from 4% in 2011 to 6% in 2012 due to the limited industrial 
growth as compared to population growth (World Bank, 2015).  Moreover, neglecting 
other non-oil sectors will negatively impact the aggregate local labour force, thus 
negatively impacting the human development indices of these petro-states, since these 
sectors occupy more labour force than the capital-intensive oil-sector.  
Another main issue that is raised by the high percentage of non-national workers 
is the working conditions in these petro-states. Walden Bello, the well-known Filipino 
Parliament member, emphasizes that the majority of labour migrants in the Middle East, 
especially the Gulf region are suffering from ‘slavery’ working conditions. “Cruelty 
towards foreign workers, from Lebanon to Kuwait, remains widespread” says Bello. In 
fact, this issue sheds light on the failure of international organizations, such as the 
International Labour Organization (ILO), which is a United Nation body, which failed to 
enforce labour laws and minimum wages in the Gulf region particularly (Bello, 2012). 
The role of developmental states as argued by Sen is crucial to planning and developing 
local and regional economies in way that not only achieve economic growth but also 
human development. According to Sen, individual freedoms are suppressed by 
capitalism. This suppression is not only for the labour migrants but also the local workers 





3.7 Economic gains from the GAFTA: Still there is a hope 
Although the previous section mentioned the limitations of the GAFTA, I argue 
that the GAFTA had many positive aspects when compared to other Arab integration 
agreements in the past. Figure 1 shows the intra-GAFTA exports. The next chapter will 
provide detailed historical analysis regarding the trade flows within the GAFTA region. 
This figure shows the positive impact of the GAFTA on intra-Arab trade. In fact, the 
GAFTA intra-Arab exports have increased on a yearly average of 15.1% from 1997 till 
2005, whereas the total world exports have grown in that period by an average of 7.9% 
only (Abedini and Péridy, 2007). 
Figure 1: intra-GAFTA and World trade growth (1993-2005, %) 
 
Source: United Nations (2007) as cited in (Abedini and Péridy, 2007).   
The GAFTA increased intra-regional trade primarily due to the removal of tariff 
barriers. GAFTA has also raised production efficiency in some member states, such as 
Egypt and Jordan, through developing economies of scale, especially in some sectors 
such as chemicals (Saidi, 2003). 
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Additionally, through decreasing the tariff rates, the GAFTA was also able to 
achieve better trade terms among member states, mainly through decreasing import prices 
and increasing the flow of commodities. The only constraint for successful trade flows is 
that trade creation should be based on promoting regional dynamic comparative 
advantage (Baldwin and Venables, 1995; Robson, 1998). Another main target of the 
member states of the GAFTA was the transfer of technological innovation, especially in 
the communication sector, where economic databases of member states can be accessed 
efficiently and effectively. However, the GAFTA has achieved minimal results in this 
field as opposed to the stated targets (Grossman and Helpman, 1991). The equality of 
distributing the economic gains of integration will remain a challenge that will need 
effectual supranationalism in order to ensure the sustainability of results.  
Since the 1990s, Arab countries have witnessed a significant increase in global 
trade relations, where a significant number of Arab countries signed the GATT 
agreement and became members of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Table 5 shows 
the WTO accession date for Arab countries: 
Table 5: Arab states WTO Accession Date 
Bahrain 1-Jan-1995 Tunisia 29-Mar-1995 





Egypt 30-Jun-1995 Jordan 11-Apr-2000 
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Source: Trade Profile, WTO as cited in (Saidi, 2003). 
Arab countries that joined the WTO enjoy better access to international markets. 
However, international institutions, including the WTO, always play in favour of the 
Northern states (Chang, 2008). Accordingly, regional integration agreements can provide 
member states of a specific regional integration agreement with better negotiation skills 
with these international institutions, such as the WTO, and also better access to global 
markets. 
Intra-Arab trade relations can only be enhanced through a state-centric approach, 
where member states collectively manage regional resources through developing non-oil 
exports of member states based an assessment of states’ comparative advantage. Tables 6 
and 7 will show the trade flow and structure of intra-Arab trade, where oil has contributed 
with an average of 50% of total intra-Arab trade. In fact, Saudi Arabia and UAE make 
around 50% of the total GAFTA exports. On the political side, this re-affirms that the 
GCC member countries can play a major role in leading the area’s integration. On the 
imports side, UAE is the highest importing country (22.3% of the GAFTA imports). 
Saudi Arabia comes after the UAE, where it imports around 10.5 %. Finally, other 
member countries, such as Jordan, Egypt and Kuwait, contribute by 6% of the total 
GAFTA imports (WITS, 2015).  
Algeria 3-Jun-1987 Oman 9-Nov-2000 
Saudi Arabia 13-Jun-1993 Yemen 14-Apr-2000 





The dominance of oil-exports is not only hindering the progress of Arab 
integration but is also presenting a real threat for the sustainability of the economic 
growth of oil-exporting countries, which have not established their industrial base. The 
scarcity of resources will question the long-term economic growth of Arab petro-states 
when the oil reserves in these countries end. Saudi Arabia, for example, with the current 
extraction rate might run out of reserve by 2030 (“What will Saudis do,” 2014). Table 7 
provides an analysis of intra-GAFTA trade flows through highlighting the top 20 trade 
flows by commodity: 
Table 7: intra-GAFTA top-20 trade flows: breakdown by countries and 
commodities (2005, million US$) 
Rank Exporting Importing Product million US $ 
1 Saudi Arabia Bahrain Mineral fuels  1 693 
2 Qatar UAE Non classified articles 933 
3 Saudi Arabia UAE Mineral fuels 858 
4 Saudi Arabia Egypt Mineral fuels 707 
5 Oman UAE Non classified articles 676 
6 Saudi Arabia UAE Chemicals 642 
7 Saudi Arabia Jordan Mineral fuels 615 
8 Saudi Arabia Morocco Mineral fuels 519 
9 Algeria Egypt Mineral fuels 447 
10 Saudi Arabia UAE Manufact goods 422 
11 UAE Oman Beverages and tobacco 369 
12 Saudi Arabia UAE Machinery and transport equip. 350 
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13 Syria Iraq Mineral fuels 343 
14 Saudi Arabia Kuwait Manufact goods 302 
15 Bahrain Saudi Arabia Manufact goods 266 
16 Saudi Arabia Djibouti Mineral fuels 257 
17 Syria Saudi Arabia Food and live animals 247 
18 UAE Saudi Arabia Machinery and transport equip. 240 
19 Saudi Arabia Lebanon Mineral fuels 224 
20 UAE Oman Manufact goods 201 
   Total 1-20 10 312 
Source: United Nations (2007) as cited in Abedini and Péridy (2007) 
The results of the GAFTA are highly debatable given the production structure of 
Arab countries, which are mainly dependent on oil. Yet the GAFTA’s initial results set a 
strong base for a successful model of South-South integration. In fact, the GAFTA 
agreement has developed the terms of the Economic Unity Agreement in order to meet 
the contemporary global market requirements, especially regarding the products 
standards. All GAFTA members have shared their locality standards for manufactured 
and agricultural commodities in order to facilitate trade flow among Arab countries. 
Sharing these standards offer a better understanding of regional market acceptance and 
growth and allows for setting solid bases for developing dynamic comparative 
advantages.  
Moreover, the Arab League has started directing intra-Arab Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI), mainly through creating a database of all Arab private sector 
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institutions (Babili and Baghasa, 2008). However, the Arab league is not effectively 
using some available regional budgets such as the ‘Arab Trade Financing Program 
(ATFP)’, which was established in 1989 with a capital of US$500 million. This capital 
was raised by Arab financial organizations, public and private banking institutions and 
regional Monetary Funds. Effective utilization of this fund can increase intra-Arab trade 
through developing the “capabilities of Arab producers and exporters” (ATPF, 2015). 
Analyzing intra-GAFTA exports and imports provides a comprehensive 
understanding of potential trade relations, especially when focusing on the non-oil sector, 
for example chemicals, manufactured products, and transportation equipment. This 
analysis will be conducted in the fourth chapter, which will include a section to assess the 
top non-oil commodities that have intra-regional growth potential. I argue that the 
GAFTA had many positive economic gains for member states especially the dynamic 
gains of trade. However, the actual economic gains were low when compared to the 
targeted outcomes (see Abedini and Péridy , 2007; Baldwin and Venables, 1995; Robson, 
1998). States are responsible for developing their comparative advantages through 
selecting the commodities that have trade potential for exclusion or infant industry 
protection in a transparent manner with other member states (Parikh and Corneliu, 2004).  
3.8 The impact of GAFTA intra-regional trade on economic growth 
 Before focusing on assessing the economic gains of Arab integration, it is worth 
mentioning that integration agreements are mainly shaped not only for economic reasons 
but also political ones. As mentioned, achieving a successful regional integration 
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agreement should increase the bargaining power of member states within international 
institutions, such as the WTO (Younes, 2010).  
The GAFTA was limited to trade in services and lacked the needed deeper 
integration, such as the liberalization of services in agreement with the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). Re-negotiating the GAFTA to include trade in 
services will have a significant impact on intra-Arab trade performance and accordingly 
economic growth. States should plan and manage the mobility of skilled labour among 
member states, where technological experiences and best practices will be transferred and 
developed across member states (UNCTAD, 2008). The trade in services necessitates the 
development of a communication network that works for reducing the cost and timing of 
trade operations (Zarrouk, 2000).  
Additionally, setting regional social standards is a condition for successful 
development, for example, having a regional minimum wage level compared relatively 
with the purchasing power parity and price indices per country. For example, the EU has 
contemporary issues regarding social welfare especially in countries with relatively poor 
economic performance, such as Greece. However, the EU remains the most successful 
example in having acceptable minimum wages by labour unions in each country of the 
EU and setting targets for increasing labour pensions. James Galbraith (2009) argues that 
“The European Union should start a European Pension Union, leveling up pensions 
payments in the poorer member states until a common minimum standard for Europe as a 




Unlike those scholars who argue that the GAFTA agreement was not effective 
towards achieving intra-Arab integration, I argue that the GAFTA has had positive 
effects on intra-Arab trade. Figure 2 shows the increase in intra-Arab trade in the period 
of GAFTA implementation. 
Figure 2: Intra-Arab trade 
 
Source: (AMF, 2015)  
Moreover, the increase in Arab trade was one of the factors that have resulted in 
the increase in the total Arab countries GDP. Figure 3 shows the percentage of GDP 
growth of GAFTA members throughout the agreement.  
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Figure 3: GAFTA members Percentage of GDP Growth 
 
Source: (AMF, 2015).  
Scholars argue that ratio of Arab inter-trade is low compared to the ratio of Arab 
total external trade. Inter-Arab trade results, however, have relatively increased during 
the implementation of the GAFTA agreement. Figure 4 shows the ratio of Arab inter-
Trade to the total Arab trade.  
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Figure 4: Arab inter-Trade to the total Arab trade  
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3.9 The Way forward 
According to the recommendations of Nasser Saidi (2003) regarding the revival 
of Arab integration, renegotiating the terms of the GAFTA can be a perfect base towards 
achieving effectual Arab integration. Arab integration needs to include liberalization of 
trade in services along with commodities in agreement with the GATS. The poor 
infrastructure, both transportation and communication has hindered the progress of trade 
relations among Arab states. Therefore, developmental Arab states are responsible for the 
renovation and development of the needed infrastructure. States must establish strong 
financial institutions on the domestic and regional basis in order to finance the required 
investments. These investments as highlighted by Chang (2008) are financed through the 
state’s resources and enterprises. The private sector plays also a role in driving growth, 
yet the state has to govern the operations of private firms in a way that serves national 
economic and human development growth targets.  
The GAFTA is a clear implication of the ideologies of neoliberal institutionalism 
since the GAFTA has applied trade liberalization but with state intervention, mainly in 
the “exemption lists” and in intra-state negotiations of regional arrangements. Markets 
must be governed by states, whose powers must be balanced by effectual 
supranationalism. Reality proves that stronger states win more than economically weaker 
states in regional agreements, yet, integration is not only about economic gains since 
there are political and security gains that can offset the economic gains. In addition to 
that, renegotiating agreements’ terms through supranational institutions can be the main 
tools towards sustaining long term successful integration agreements (Sediq, 2013). 
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Finally, Arab integration can extract lessons from the EU model, yet, without seriously 
addressing existing barriers, as well as new challenges, Arab integration will remain a 
















4. Chapter four: Assessing the potential economic gains of Arab 
integration 
Analyzing the current economic performance of Arab countries in the GAFTA 
shows that non-oil exporting countries, such as Egypt, Morocco, and Lebanon, are 
suffering from negative Balances of Payment (BOP) results, which mainly result from 
lacking the competitiveness of trade in the global markets as a result of ‘free trade’ rules 
that were dictated on Arab countries by the WTO that calls for the ‘shock therapy’ of 
market liberalization. It is worth differentiating that the GAFTA calls for a gradual 
liberalization of intra-Arab markets over 10 years in order to enhance regional trade, 
while allowing for protectionism and exceptions for infant strategic industries.  
Non-oil exporting countries, such as Sudan and Morocco, are mainly exporting 
agricultural food commodities, chemicals, crude materials, manufactured commodities, 
and machinery. However, the percentage of total Arab non-oil exports remains 
significantly low when compared to oil exports or to the total Arab trade (Zarrouk, 1998). 
Table 8 shows commodity structure of Arab Intra-trade: 
Table 8 
Item Total Arab Intra-Exports 
(in million USD) 
Total Arab Intra-Imports 
(in million USD) 
Food and Beverages 3.99 4.19 4.11 14.84 13.87 14 
Crude Materials 2.53 2.6 2.75 6.04 6.01 6.29 
Mineral Fuels 68.14 67.52 67.83 4.77 5.26 5 
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Chemicals 5.73 5.67 5.82 8.88 7.64 8.27 
Machinery and 
Transport 3.43 3.47 3.43 33.12 34.52 33.52 
Manufactures 15.74 16.01 15.54 29.83 30.4 30.01 
Miscellaneous 0.45 0.52 0.53 2.52 2.29 2.91 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: (WITS, 2015) 
The low percentage of non-oil commodities trade has been reflected negatively on 
the Balance of Payment (BOP) of non-oil export Arab countries in comparison to oil-
exporting states. Figure 5 shows the BOP of some GAFTA members in the time period 
1997 to 2012. It reveals that oil exporting states enjoy a surplus in their BOPs in 













Source: (WITS, 2015). 
These income gaps are hindering effectual integration since rich petro-states 
refuse to share the returns of oil with other poorer states of the region, thus hindering 
integration attempts. However, these returns could be utilized in the form of FDIs that 
will have a high Return on Investment (ROI) for both the donor and the recipient (Saidi, 
2003). Rent seeking leaders, especially in the relatively poor non-oil exporting countries, 
demolish the state’s role in leading development. The state can derive the economic 
growth of sectors based on an understanding of production capacities and the availability 
of the factors of production, both labour and capital. The ‘laissez-faire’ approach of ‘free 
markets’ fail to plan the growth of promising economic sectors that have a comparative 
advantage, which can be developed through state intervention (Lin and Chang, 2009). 
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The failure to direct and develop these sectors leads to a loss of the comparative 
advantage of states and accordingly a continuous market failure in comparison to other 
markets, either the US or European markets, which have witnessed a very high level of 
protectionism in early stages before advocating for free trade. Chang (2008) emphasizes 
that “Britain remained a highly protectionist country until the mid-9th century. In 1820, 
Britain’s average tariff rate on manufacturing imports was 45–55%, compared to 6–8% in 
the Low Countries, 8–12% in Germany and Switzerland and around 20% in France” 
(Chang, 2008). 
The global markets, including Arab markets, are flooded with Chinese 
commodities. The consistent economic growth of China was not a result of ‘free’ trade. 
China has witnessed a high level of national economic planning and state-driven 
globalization that not only has enabled the development of infant industries but also 
directed Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs) towards the development of multiple 
industrial sectors, especially textiles and electronics (Guthrie, 2009). Arab states need to 
direct their economies through strategic planning of market development, both on a local 
and regional basis. These intergovernmental plans will lead to achieving a level of market 
maturity to compete with global markets. Subsidizing infant industries is against free 
trade notions, yet, the US is highly subsidizing the strategic sector in the US economy, 




Even with the political unrest in the Arab region, intra-regional trade has been 
positively increasing both on the imports and exports sides. Table 8 and 9 shows latest 
figures of GAFTA intra-imports then intra-exports respectively (in 1000 USD).  
Table 8: Arab intra-imports 
 
  2000 2003 2006 2009 2011 2013 
Algeria 714,865 2,051,792 2,705,038 5,887,798 9,226,145 12,466,539 
Bahrain 1,650,486 2,387,682 3,183,749 4,723,205 20,588,914 na 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 3,888,343 2,583,088 9,676,077 13,989,451 21,851,538 23,949,013 
Jordan 1,735,751 4,384,855 10,811,674 12,911,689 18,494,096 18,696,187 
Kuwait 3,428,940 4,920,690 11,635,100 na na 20,073,555 
Lebanon 2,265,512 2,954,717 4,614,943 6,089,384 10,102,749 8,536,627 
Libya na 1,681,947 na 4,374,866 na na 
Morocco 3,382,112 3,449,584 7,342,080 10,292,257 17,103,187 16,896,525 
Oman 6,372,855 4,319,841 12,249,144 19,563,599 29,157,926 46,014,459 
Qatar 537,279 773,892 1,848,731 na na 4,196,593 
United 
Arab 
Emirates 6,119,841 9,521,147 21,004,165 29,685,382 39,466,552 na 
Grand 
Total 31,090,582 39,029,237 85,070,702 107,517,631 165,991,106 150,829,498 




Table 9: Arab intra-exports (in 1000 USD) 
 
  2000 2003 2006 2009 2011 2013 
Algeria 722,565 1,397,999 2,551,351 3,065,584 5,232,010 7,734,892 
Bahrain 1,614,612 2,658,279 3,451,203 6,880,276 14,346,058 na 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 2,153,434 3,310,132 6,503,838 26,672,973 30,108,342 34,443,383 
Iraq 751,694 na 500,239 412,279 na 909,117 
Jordan 1,872,277 4,591,129 7,625,077 11,810,502 13,114,387 14,982,465 
Kuwait 1,351,525 2,392,654 4,708,766 7,115,960 na 10,558,167 
Lebanon 1,271,089 2,452,191 3,839,603 5,874,944 5,830,538 7,314,360 
Libya na na na 2,272,344 na na 
Morocco 957,355 1,089,483 1,617,059 2,284,577 2,731,734 3,180,331 
Oman 4,207,048 1,929,902 7,399,175 13,712,989 15,957,185 25,458,316 
Qatar 654,876 563,382 1,648,412 2,417,728 5,231,657 5,593,523 
United Arab 
Emirates 11,791,596 17,724,308 35,437,951 58,897,445 55,921,519 na 
Grand Total 27,348,071 38,109,459 75,282,674 141,417,600 148,473,429 110,174,556 
Source: (WITS, 2015). 
The previous figures show that intra-Arab trade relations are increasing in value, 
however, Arab countries, especially the non-oil exporting countries, have a low 
“openness to trade” index, which measures the total trade of a country as a share of the 
country’s GDP. These low indices can be justified if Arab states are working on 
developing their comparative advantages through protecting infant industries. The failure 
to develop the needed industrial and agricultural sector has lead to an endless dependence 
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on external loans from international institutions, such as the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) that advocate for the ‘shock therapy’ of free markets 
and sudden privatization that would negatively impact Arab economic development 
(Hudson, 1999). Figure 5 maps Arab “openness to trade” indices as of latest year 2012:  
Figure 5 
Source: (WITS, 2015). 
 The above figure measures the exports of goods and services of a specific country 
in relation to the country’s GDP. Oil-exporting countries have higher trade openness 
indices than non-oil exporting states, yet, oil-exports are not sustainable over the long run 
given the scarcity of resources. Scholars argue that the low trade openness of non-oil 
exporting countries stem from the ISI closed economic policies, which was dominant in 
the 1960s and 70s and have imposed very high tariff rate structures. However, I argue 
that trade is a tool towards achieving economic growth but the state has to have 
sovereignty in planning the economy, especially developing sectors that have relative 
comparative advantage. Regional integration agreements should provide member states 
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stronger negotiation powers against the hegemonic rules of the WTO, which mainly plays 
in favour of Northern economies (Chang, 2008; Lin and Chang, 2009).  
The integration of rich oil-exporting countries with low-income non-oil exporting 
countries needs a strategic vision of Arab leaders to acknowledge that integration 
decisions are not only about economic returns but also political gains.  Having a vision of 
developing regional comparative advantage will compensate short term economic losses 
that could results from trade diversion, where commodities imported from another 
member state of an integration agreement can be higher than those imported from non-
member state. However, state decisions that lead regions to achieve political and 
economic security should establish a solid industrial and agricultural base aside from 
vulnerable oil economies (Galal and Hoekman, 2003).  
Before analyzing the potentiality of Arab economic integration, it is worth 
mentioning that states are responsible for developing their “dynamic” comparative 
advantages mainly through analyzing the industrial and agricultural bases and 
determining the local and regional comparative advantage in order to achieve economic 
growth and accordingly the targeted human development (Lin and Chang, 2009). The 
1960s and 70s closed economic policies in many Arab countries have failed, not due the 
role of the state itself, but rather due to a lack of proper analysis of comparative 
advantage and rushing industrial capital intensive commodities, thus reaching negative 
economic results. In fact, these ISI policies have succeeded with other developmental 
states, such as China and the Asian tigers, namely South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, 
and Taiwan (Chang, 2008). 
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4.1 The Methodology procedures: 
In order to assess the expected economic gains of Arab regional integration, this 
paper will run an economic simulation using the WITS software, particularly the SMART 
simulator. Through this simulation, I will analyze the impact of a tariff reform within the 
GAFTA members to assess the economic impact on trade variables, namely imports, 
exports, trade creation, and trade diversion. The main advantage of this “market access 
analysis” is the fact that it uses the actual tariff rates applied per country and the latest 
trade figures as reported by countries and saved on the databases of the WTO and the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
5
. 
Before conducting the simulation, the following section will provide detailed 
analysis of GAFTA intra-imports and exports with a special focus on commodities.  
Table 10 and 11 will provide an analysis of GAFTA intra imports and exports. 































Algeria 63.0 0.4 14.0 20.2 3.7 164.3 221.9 98.2 81.3 4.1 
Bahrein 148.2 9.3 21.3 1708.3 8.9 98.2 225.2 167.7 69.4 30.3 
Comoros 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 1.0 0.2 0.4 
Djibouti 15.2 1.0 2.3 257.0 0.5 11.5 26.2 21.2 12.7 2.6 
                                                          
5 I would like to thank the Canada Foundation for Innovation for supporting the trade and 
development lab that allow premium access to UNComtrade database. 
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Egypt 130.2 6.0 78.8 1153.9 0.5 186.7 171.7 110.2 38.1 39.5 
Iraq 299.8 156.3 13.3 357.4 104.3 189.2 312.8 372.6 111.2 34.1 
Jordan 240.9 25.7 27.2 700.8 4.1 251.0 226.1 153.3 54.8 41.4 
Kuwait 296.1 44.1 24.3 153.5 9.2 197.9 472.6 280.6 124.6 11.7 
Lebanon 139.6 1.1 50.9 448.4 8.2 102.1 143.9 47.7 24.1 9.6 
Lybia 181.2 13.8 9.6 3.7 56.7 110.1 279.6 165.7 125.2 34.4 
Mauritania 6.8 2.9 0.5 17.0 0.9 5.2 23.1 8.2 6.2 0.5 
Morocco 32.0 3.2 11.5 698.2 1.5 173.9 124.1 23.0 14.8 3.1 
Oman 103.6 370.0 10.7 7.7 8.4 150.0 331.0 154.3 61.1 8.1 
Qatar 161.8 13.5 44.1 6.8 8.6 98.7 266.7 202.3 65.1 22.0 
Saudi 
Arabia 720.1 17.7 101.3 16.4 34.3 375.2 715.3 502.2 220.0 217.2 
Somalia 50.3 7.2 3.8 1.6 5.4 14.7 32.7 22.1 20.9 0.3 
Sudan 47.5 0.2 13.2 23.1 3.6 107.1 139.7 159.2 66.0 22.2 
Syria 175.0 4.5 24.8 88.9 8.2 160.8 241.3 166.5 21.3 30.7 
Tunisia 23.7 0.6 28.1 134.3 0.1 53.5 63.9 16.4 11.4 4.7 
UAE 414.6 18.4 112.3 1235.4 51.0 913.7 808.1 710.4 306.9 1621.9 
Yemen 98.4 7.6 7.6 181.6 2.5 77.1 159.3 104.1 55.3 22.9 
Total 
(million 
US$) 3349.3 703.5 599.6 7214.2 320.6 3441.0 4985.5 3486.9 1490.6 2161.7 
Total (%) 12.1% 2.5% 2.2% 26.0% 1.2% 12.4% 18.0% 12.6% 5.4% 7.8% 





































Algeria 10.5 0.6 10.1 786.8 7.0 27.1 62.9 21.1 2.0 0.0 
Bahrein 21.3 9.3 80.6 0.5 0.4 35.7 472.8 122.7 32.8 4.3 
Egypt 287.7 0.9 46.7 376.4 20.8 137.2 489.1 86.4 62.4 3.9 
Iraq n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Jordan 411.9 75.5 28.7 7.2 94.4 517.9 238.8 303.8 135.5 2.1 
Kuwait 39.5 8.3 6.0 10.3 2.4 187.6 100.8 102.7 40.8 16.4 
Lebanon 134.8 19.0 18.4 1.1 6.3 72.7 272.5 216.6 182.3 1.4 
Lybia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Mauritania 0.0 0.0 7.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 
Morocco 128.5 2.8 24.0 15.7 1.0 79.0 94.1 14.7 14.5 0.0 
Oman 266.6 16.7 47.0 111.0 73.2 105.3 294.9 201.7 86.2 928.1 
Qatar 23.8 0.8 16.9 33.3 0.5 250.5 81.3 208.8 29.0 1085.2 
Saudi Arabia 704.3 56.8 94.9 5126.8 40.2 1502.6 1491.6 890.5 260.1 2.4 
Sudan 126.7 0.1 106.2 83.9 0.1 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.2 13.5 
Syria 627.1 55.2 46.5 375.9 8.4 67.4 213.0 43.1 113.5 60.9 
Tunisia 179.7 9.6 7.6 14.5 55.5 205.1 277.9 120.8 63.0 0.0 
UAE 233.6 424.0 50.5 60.9 9.6 188.4 885.0 1082.1 461.9 42.8 
Yemen 153.2 23.6 7.8 210.0 0.9 63.3 10.6 71.9 6.7 0.0 
Total 
(millionUS$) 
3349.2 703.2 599.6 7214.3 320.7 3441.1 4985.3 3486.9 1490.9 2161.7 
Source: United Nations (2007) as cited in Abedini and Péridy (2007 
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Table 10 and 11 re-confirm that the GCC member states are the key members in 
Arab integration agreements. Yet, UAE represents a better oil-state model, since the UAE 
has developed the industrial and services sectors to sustain economic growth aside from 
the vulnerable oil sector. Before simulating the potential impact of the GAFTA on other 
non-oil sectors, such as chemicals, crude materials, food commodities, and other non-fuel 
products, it is worth mentioning that Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco have been the main 
non-oil exporting countries contributing to Arab intra-trade (WITS, 2015).  
Table 12 highlights the most competitive non-oil commodities in Arab intra-trade. 
This table lists the most competitive commodities per selected country. Each country can 
develop its comparative advantages based on the listed commodities after an analysis to 
determine the needed labour and capital investment that are required to develop its 
comparative advantages. Having a regional vision that fosters economic specialization, 
where countries share their comparative advantages or even the potential economic 
sectors, can result in better intra-trade. Using the Harmonized System (HS) classification 
of the UNComtrade data, the commodities listed in able 12 can theoretically be a starting 
point, per country, to develop regional and global comparative advantage. Assessing 
market acceptance and investment creation possibilities remains the main challenge for 
each country. The removal of tariff barriers among the GAFTA members is only a tool to 
help foster intra-region trade so that they can compete in global markets. Sharing a Pan-
Arab region vision has not developed the existing industrial and agricultural base. 
However, table 12 acts as a prescription or a starting point to develop other sustainable 











89 Ships, boats and floating structures 137 Egypt 
46 Manufactores of straw 127 Egypt 
62 Articles of apparel and clothing acc-
not knitted 
117 Egypt 
29 Organic chemicals 101 Egypt 
51 Wool, fire or coarse animal hair 83 Egypt 
63 Other made up textile articles; 82 Egypt 
16 Prepration of meat 59 Egypt 
18 Cocoa and cocoa preprations 49 Egypt 
76 Aluminium and articles therof 45 Egypt 
15 Animal or vegetable fats oils 771 Jordan 
29 Organic chemicals 381 Jordan 
12 Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits 145 Jordan 
34 Soap 121 Jordan 
9 Coffee, tea,mate and spices 116 Jordan 
5 Products of animal origin 92 Jordan 
11 Products of the milling industry 88 Jordan 
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39 Plastics and articels thereof 46 Jordan 
62 Articles of apparel and clothing acc-
not knitted 
59 Jordan 
11 Products of the milling industry 141 Lebanon 
49 Printed books,newspapers 88 Lebanon 
25 Salt;sulphur; earth and stone; 51 Lebanon 
11 Products of the milling industry 434 Morocco 
7 Edible vegetables 164 Morocco 
20 Preprations of vegetables, fruit,nuts 125 Morocco 
61 Articles of apparel and clothing 
accessories 
60 Morocco 
16 Prepration of meat 49 Morocco 
88 Aircraft,spacecraft,and parts thereof 714 Saudi Arabia 
78 Lead and articles thereof 242 Saudi Arabia 
5 Products of animal origin 239 Saudi Arabia 
75 Nickel and articles thereof 151 Saudi Arabia 
95 Toys,games and sports requisites 136 Saudi Arabia 
18 Cocoa and cocoa preprations 83 Saudi Arabia 
74 Copper and articles thereof 216 Tunisia 
17 Sugars and sugar confectionery 153 Tunisia 
91 Clocks and watches and parts 143 Tunisia 
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Source: (WITS, 2015) 
Before conducting the simulation, and in order to understand the existing tariff 
structure among Arab states, table 13 shows the latest existing tariff rates for GAFTA 
members as per the World Bank’s indicators. These tariffs are similar to some countries 
of Latin America, for example Argentina (average of 6%), meanwhile, they are relatively 
higher than Northern states, where Australia, for example, has an average of tariff rate 

















mean tariff % 
Algeria .. 14.5 7.75 14.15 8.94 
Bahrain 2012 6.17 9.58 3.91 3.3 
Egypt 2009 37.58 6.35 9.36 9.54 
Kuwait 2012 3.75 3.67 4.44 4.47 
Lebanon .. 8.15 5.03 5.16 5.07 
Libya .. 0 0 0 0 
thereof 
11 Products of the milling industry 82 Tunisia 
42 Articles of leather 80 Tunisia 
89 Ships,boats and floating structures 53 Tunisia 
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Morocco 2012 13.19 5.24 3.67 2.18 
Oman 2012 3.7 4.33 4.17 4.06 
Qatar 2012 3.52 3.95 4.38 4.14 
Saudi Arabia 2012 3.96 3.96 4.44 4.35 
Syrian Arab 
Republic 
.. 6.48 6.12 6.69 6.13 
UAE 2012 3.92 3.83 4.38 4 
Yemen, Rep. .. 8.01 6.71 5.89 5.96 
Source: World Bank, 2014 
The applied simulation evaluates the impact of a 100% tariff removal for specific 
beneficiaries, which are the GAFTA members. The simulation applied a tariff removal on 
the following group products: agricultural products, agricultural raw materials, chemical 
products, food commodities, fuel products, manufactured commodities, petroleum 
commodities, textile products, transportation commodities, which include machinery and 
transportation equipment, and finally an aggregation of total non-oil commodities. The 
year 2009 was selected as base year since was the latest common year of data available 
for member states on the simulation database.  
The results of the simulation have shown a zero change in exports in the case of 





 Exports Before 
in 1000 USD 
Exports After in 
1000 USD 
Exports Change  In 
Revenue in 1000 USD 
Algeria Agriculture 3394.956 3394.956 0 
Algeria AgrRaw 1859.092 1859.092 0 
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Algeria Chemical 166.148 166.148 0 
Algeria Food 1535.864 1535.864 0 
Algeria manuf 1998.571 1998.571 0 
Algeria NonOil 5393.527 5393.527 0 
Algeria OthrManf 1832.423 1832.423 0 
Algeria TotalNo95 5393.527 5393.527 0 
Bahrain Chemical 30986.10 30986.106 0 
Bahrain Food 138146.437 138146.437 0 
Bahrain manuf 383384.403 383384.403 0 
Bahrain NonOil 805872.667 805872.667 0 
Bahrain OresMtls 284341.827 284341.827 0 
Bahrain OthrManf 292684.944 292684.944 0 
Bahrain TotalNo95 805872.667 805872.667 0 
Bahrain Transp 59713.353 59713.353 0 
Egypt Food 387555.688 387555.688 0 
Egypt manuf 312184.197 312184.197 0 
Egypt NonOil 773700.319 773700.319 0 
Egypt OresMtls 73960.434 73960.434 0 
Egypt OthrManf 192488.135 192488.135 0 
Egypt TotalNo95 773700.319 773700.319 0 
Egypt Transp 119696.063 119696.063 0 
Source: WITS, 2015 
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The previous table shows a sample of the result figures of the simulation for some 
GAFTA member countries when trading with the Saudi Arabia after a full removal of 
tariffs, which is the targeted tariff condition of the GAFTA and other Pan-Arab 
integration previous attempts. The lack of change in results was also evident in Kuwait, 
Bahrain, and United Arab Emirates for the previously mentioned product categories since 
oil-export countries originally have low tariffs (WITS, 2015). 
As stated on the WITS website, the simulation outcomes provide useful insights 
on the shift of trade patterns given the change in bilateral and multilateral trade relations. 
Having a Pan-Arab trade agreement simulation shows some positive results for non-Gulf 
oil exporting countries, such as Morocco, Lebanon, and Egypt. For example, Egypt has a 
potential of increasing the exports to Algeria in case of removing tariff barriers. This 
increase in trade is a positive result of trade, yet, trade liberalization in itself is not the 
goal. Achieving the level of industrial competitiveness that can only be achieved through 
developing dynamic comparative advantages by the state is the mean to trade 
development, thus economic growth. Short term loses of tariff revenue should be 
compensated through the increase in trade volumes. The equality of the gains of trade 
will remain a challenge given the lack of democracy and institutional frameworks in most 
Arab states (Hudson, 1999). The following table shows the results of Algeria when 
removing tariffs with other GAFTA members:  
Partner  Commodity 
Group  
Exports Before 
in 1000 USD 
Exports After in 
1000 USD 
Change in Rev in 
1000 USD 
Egypt  Agriculture 62961.854 62961.864 0.009 
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Egypt  AgrRaw 743.217 743.226 0.009 
Egypt  Chemical 43070.666 43076.24 5.574 
Egypt  Food 62218.637 62218.637 0 
Egypt  Fuels 22829.168 22829.179 0.011 
Egypt  Manuf 402941.096 402947.237 6.141 
Egypt  NonOil 480064.238 480070.388 6.15 
Egypt  OresMtls 14161.287 14161.288 0 
Egypt  OthrManf 281225.115 281225.509 0.394 
Egypt  PetrlPrd 3494.941 3494.952 0.011 
Egypt  Textiles 4743.283 4743.316 0.034 
 
It is very obvious that the change in exports before and after is very low compared 
to the expected results given the same language, geographical proximity, and other socio-
economic factors that should increase trade volumes and values. Same slightly positive 












In Revenue in 
1000 USD 
Export Change 
In Revenue in 
1000 USD 
Morocco Algeria Agriculture 1603.806 1609.588 5.782 
Morocco Algeria Chemical 2887.444 2887.445 0.001 
Morocco Algeria Food 1603.806 1609.588 5.782 
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Morocco Algeria Fuels 692916.034 692916.034 0 
Morocco Algeria manuf 12563.353 12563.354 0.001 
Morocco Algeria NonOil 26177.081 26182.864 5.783 
Morocco Algeria OresMtls 12009.921 12009.921 0 
Morocco Algeria OthrManf 7968.152 7968.153 0 
Morocco Algeria PetrlPrd 14999.925 14999.925 0 
Morocco Algeria Textiles 3.666 3.666 0 
Morocco Algeria TotalNo95 719093.115 719098.898 5.783 
Morocco Algeria Transp 1707.757 1707.757 0 
Morocco Lebanon Agriculture 1329.833 1329.962 0.129 
Morocco Lebanon AgrRaw 761.947 761.975 0.028 
Morocco Lebanon Chemical 3192.618 3193.814 1.196 
Morocco Lebanon Food 567.886 567.987 0.101 
Morocco Lebanon Fuels 1.886 1.886 0 
Morocco Lebanon manuf 26887.672 26888.935 1.263 
Morocco Lebanon NonOil 28282.372 28283.765 1.392 
Morocco Lebanon OresMtls 64.867 64.867 0 
Morocco Lebanon OthrManf 19870.699 19870.76 0.061 
Morocco Lebanon PetrlPrd 1.886 1.886 0 
Morocco Lebanon Textiles 39.079 39.079 0 
Morocco Lebanon TotalNo95 28284.258 28285.651 1.392 
Morocco Lebanon Transp 3824.355 3824.361 0.006 
Morocco Egypt Agriculture 97277.437 97342.791 65.354 
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Morocco Egypt AgrRaw 1761.488 1762.543 1.055 
Morocco Egypt Chemical 55155.883 55158.651 2.769 
Morocco Egypt Food 95515.949 95580.248 64.299 
Morocco Egypt Fuels 8545.944 8545.944 0 
Morocco Egypt manuf 241980.371 242009.249 28.878 
Morocco Egypt NonOil 372700.786 372795.018 94.232 
Morocco Egypt OresMtls 33442.978 33442.978 0 
Morocco Egypt OthrManf 142015.01 142017.614 2.604 
Morocco Egypt PetrlPrd 8339.317 8339.317 0 
Morocco Egypt Textiles 14966.335 14967.498 1.163 
Morocco Egypt TotalNo95 380988.458 381082.69 94.232 
Morocco Egypt Transp 44809.478 44832.983 23.505 
Morocco Emirates  Agriculture 26318.709 26364.756 46.046 
Morocco Emirates  AgrRaw 50.392 50.392 0 
Morocco Emirates  Chemical 29406.72 29410.863 4.143 
Morocco Emirates  Food 26268.317 26314.364 46.046 
Morocco Emirates  Fuels 4697.53 4697.53 0 
Morocco Emirates  manuf 111845.785 111852.841 7.056 
Morocco Emirates  NonOil 176410.94 176464.042 53.102 
Morocco Emirates  OresMtls 38246.446 38246.446 0 
Morocco Emirates  OthrManf 72119.405 72122.298 2.893 
Morocco Emirates  PetrlPrd 4697.53 4697.53 0 
Morocco Emirates  Textiles 7760.24 7761.442 1.202 
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Morocco Emirates  TotalNo95 181072.1 181125.202 53.102 
Morocco Emirates  Transp 10319.66 10319.679 0.019 
Source :( WITS, 2015) 
All simulation results have shown a slight incremental increase in trade values in 
the case of non-oil export countries. The simulation was based on preferential trade 
conditions that segregate the price effect and existing trade relations with other non-
GAFTA states. Therefore, the problem with the simulated incremental intra-Arab trade is 
the fact that they result from trade-diversion, where imports are shifted from a low-cost 
producing non member states to the member states, which produce same categories at 
higher cost (WITS, 2015). It is worth mentioning that the EU has been increasing the 
trade relation with Arab countries, especially the Mediterranean states since the 2000s 
(Momani, 2007).  The simulation has reported a trade diversion which actually stems 
from the high production cost of Arab countries compared to Chinese commodities, 
which has a cost advantage that results from economies of scale and a solid industrial 
base, which has been developed by the Chinese developmental state (WITS, 2015; 
Chang, 2008).  Moreover, it is worth mentioning that the removal of tariff barriers, even 
applied only for GAFTA members, will result in a loss of tariff revenues, especially in 
the non-oil exporting countries. However, since Arab intra-trade is significantly low, this 
tariff revenue loss on the short-term can be compensated by the increase in trade volumes 
on the long-term.  
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 The following table shows the simulation results of Egypt taking Algeria as a 
partner country. Trade diversion results were highly evident in the case of Egypt, where 
Arab integration will cause a negative impact on the total trade.   
 
Trade diversion results were also evident in the simulation of Egypt’s trade with other 
GAFTA members as follows: 
Reporter Partner Country 
Trade Diversion Effect in 
1000 USD 
Egypt Morocco -17.439 
Egypt Qatar -0.156 














Effect in 1000 
USD 
Trade Diversion Effect 
in 1000 USD 
Egypt Algeria Fuels -0.048 0 0 -0.048 
Egypt Algeria manuf -0.003 0 0 -0.003 
Egypt Algeria NonOil -0.003 0 0 -0.003 
Egypt Algeria OresMtls 0 0 0 0 
Egypt Algeria OthrManf -0.003 0 0 -0.003 
Egypt Algeria PetrlPrd 0 0 0 0 
Egypt Algeria TotalNo95 -0.051 0 0 -0.051 
Egypt Algeria Transp 0 0 0 0 
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Egypt United Arab Emirates -22.316 
Egypt Yemen -0.317 
 
*For further details regarding the data per country see the attached appendix. 
The same negative total trade results were evident in the case of Morocco where 
applying the actual trade simulation given the existing trade volumes and multilateral 










Trade  Creation 
Effect in 1000 
USD 
Trade Diversion 
Effect in 1000 
USD 
Egypt Agriculture -0.396 0 8.383 -8.779 
Egypt AgrRaw 0.098 0 0.124 -0.026 
Egypt Chemical -0.458 0 0.185 -0.644 
Egypt Food -0.495 0 8.259 -8.754 
Egypt Fuels -0.113 0 0 -0.113 
Egypt manuf -9.399 0 2.442 -11.841 
Egypt NonOil -10.069 0 10.825 -20.894 
Egypt OresMtls -0.274 0 0 -0.274 
Egypt OthrManf -9.161 0 0.187 -9.348 
Egypt PetrlPrd -0.109 0 0 -0.109 
Egypt Textiles -0.907 0 0.074 -0.981 
Egypt TotalNo95 -10.154 0 10.825 -20.979 
Egypt Transp 0.22 0 2.07 -1.85 
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Algeria Agriculture 0.638 0 0.425 0.213 
Algeria Chemical -0.046 0 0 -0.046 
Algeria Food 0.638 0 0.425 0.213 
Algeria Fuels -1.189 0 0 -1.189 
Algeria manuf -0.155 0 0 -0.155 
Algeria NonOil 0.483 0 0.425 0.058 
Algeria OresMtls 0 0 0 0 
Algeria OthrManf -0.107 0 0 -0.107 
Algeria PetrlPrd -0.556 0 0 -0.556 
Algeria Textiles 0 0 0 0 
Algeria TotalNo95 -0.706 0 0.425 -1.131 
Algeria Transp -0.002 0 0 -0.002 
Jordan Agriculture 0.575 0 0.336 0.24 
Jordan Chemical -0.008 0 0.001 -0.009 
Jordan Food 0.575 0 0.336 0.24 
Jordan manuf -0.137 0 0.296 -0.433 
Jordan NonOil 0.427 0 0.632 -0.205 
Jordan OresMtls -0.012 0 0 -0.012 
Jordan OthrManf -0.118 0 0.002 -0.12 
Jordan Textiles -0.045 0 0 -0.046 
Jordan TotalNo95 0.427 0 0.632 -0.205 




Viner (1950) argues that trade diversion negatively impacts the economic welfare 
of the importing countries, which is the case of non-oil exporting countries in the case of 
the GAFTA’s simulation. On the other hand, there are studies that argue that trade 
diversion can be beneficial of developing countries since they rely on tariff revenues as a 
part of their GDPs (Elkan, 1975). I argue that developing a solid industrial and 
agricultural base that is shaped through developmental state is the way to achieve 
economic growth. The state has to direct its resources, both labour and capital, towards 
achieving sustainable economic development, which can be enlarged through regional 
state agreements that can accept short term trade diversions to develop comparative 
advantages. Non-oil products have a potential of growth based on each state’s 
comparative advantage, where the states are responsible for the development of their 










5.Chapter 5: Conclusion, limitations, and future recommendations: 
This thesis analyzed Arab integration legacy to determine the political and 
economic issues that have stinted past integration attempts. Arab countries are highly 
endowed by natural resources, particularly oil. However, the highly dependence on oil 
revenues have reduced the Arab incentives to develop their economies and establish a 
sustainable industrial and agricultural base. This dependency on oil resembles the “Dutch 
disease”, yet, Holland as well as other European countries are highly endowed by natural 
resources, skilled labour, and well-established infrastructure. The lack of democracy and 
the dominance of corrupted dictatorships have also hindered the progress of development 
institutional frameworks that can manage and control economic development within Arab 
states. Arab integration has not yielded the targeted results given the large market size of 
Arab countries. Understanding the theoretical background behind regionalization 
provides useful tools that can help understand the poor status quo of Arab regional 
integration.  
Several theories have discussed regionalization and international integration 
Agreements. The two main classification approaches in theorizing integration are the 
economic approach and the political science approach. The economic approach is mainly 
concerned with the analysis of the economic gains that accrue as a result of integration. 
The two dominant theories in the economic approach are the ‘regional economic 
integration’ and the ‘optimal currency’ theories. The regional economic integration 
theory which was founded by Bela Balassa (1962) analyzes the progression of economic 
interdependence among a number of states that starts with a preferential trade area, 
113 
 
followed by a free trade area, then custom union, common market and the last step is 
reaching a full economic and political union that witness and partial or full harmonization 
of law (Balassa, 1962). The ‘optimal currency’ theory emphasizes the socio-economic 
benefits that result to member states of an agreement when they use a common currency 
(Mundell, 1961). The Euro, in the case of the EU, serves as a good example, where the 
EU member states have witnessed stable exchange rates since they started using the Euro 
in the 1990s (Fielding and Shields, 2005). 
The political science approach is mainly concerned with the governance of 
integration and the mechanism of achieving effectual integration. The main theories 
within the political science approach are functionalism, neofunctionalism, 
intergovernmentalism, and neoliberal institutionalism theories. I have argued that 
neoliberal institutionalism provides the best approach in analyzing regional integration 
since it emphasizes the state’s role in achieving development both politically and 
economically. In fact, integration agreements are not only about economic gains but also 
long term political gains that can offset short term economic returns (Galal and Hoekman, 
2003). 
States are responsible for providing the needed infrastructure for trade, which is 
achieved through managing the state’s resources (Chang, 2008). Developing local 
economies can only be achieved through state-centric actions that protect infant 
industries and engage in bilateral and multilateral trade relations that are based on an 
assessment of the state’s comparative advantages. States are also responsible for 
governing the operations of the private sector through setting legislations that minimize 
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the negative externalities of the private sector, such as tax evasions, monopolistic moves, 
and labour exploitation (Fridell, 2008).  
Neoclassical economists argue that ‘free trade’ is the only route to achieve 
economic growth. Such notions disguise the reality and historical evolvement of the 
economies of Northern states. In fact, the US and Europe have witnessed very high level 
of protectionism in their early stages of industrial development till they were able to 
achieve a level of competitiveness that enabled them to penetrate global markets and 
conquer other states that have not developed their comparative advantages. These notions 
also neglect the colonial history and its impact in destroying the local comparative 
advantages of many European colonies (See Chang 2008, Fridell, 2013).  
International economic institutions such as the World Bank and the WTO are 
serving the hegemonic needs of larger economic powers, in particularly the US. 
Therefore, achieving successful intergovernmental integration agreements among states 
can help them build economic blocks that can have better negotiation capacities with 
these international institutions. The EU members, for examples, have collectively 
achieved more than what they could have achieved on individual state basis (Hosny, 
2013).  
Moreover, neoclassical economists measure development in terms of absolute 
economic growth, however, GDP growth is an element towards achieving real economic 
development that aims at enhancing the capabilities of human capital. Welfare states are 
responsible for improving the capabilities of people through providing them with the 
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needed access to education and health care services. In fact, such welfare policies are 
considered real investments that have very high returns since these calibers are the real 
tools towards achieving economic development (Sen, 1999). Arab states are responsible 
for achieving intergovernmental agreements that work for achieving economic growth 
that should be utilized by these states for economic and human development.  
Since the 1950s Arab integration attempts have significantly increased in numbers 
especially after the establishment of the Arab league in 1945. Arab countries are suffering 
from high GDP discrepancy where rich oil-exporting petro states are reluctant to share oil 
returns in case of regional integration with other non-oil exporting states. There are 
several conditions that have hindered Arab integration. For example, Arab countries 
suffer from low complementarity indices, which emphasizes that Arab intra-trade 
capacities are relatively low especially due to similarities in their produced commodities 
(Saidi, 2003). This similarity stems from the colonial history that has directed the 
agricultural and industrial bases of their colonies to serve their needs without any 
development for their comparative advantages.  These indices can only be improved 
through the diversity of Arab states’ industrial bases, which results from developing their 
dynamic comparative advantages as proposed in table 12. 
On the other hand, Arab countries share a number of factors that can increase the 
likelihood of regional integration attempts, such as the geographical proximity, which can 
significantly decrease the transactional and transportation costs. Also, from theoretical 
basis, Arab countries share a common language which improves trade operations on the 
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regional level (Wei, Shang-jin, 1996). Despite all the previously mentioned factors, Arab 
integration still remains on paper (Saidi, 2003). 
Arab countries are also suffering from ineffectual supranationalism, where 
specialized supranational institutions are needed in order to enhance the scope and scale 
of integration. The inefficiency of these supranational institutions can be attributed to the 
limited number of employees and the lack of specialization as opposed to the EU. Arab 
integration cannot be compared to the EU which has a long history of social movements 
that has developed democratic institutional frameworks. The EU, for example, has a 
supranational legislative entity, which is the European parliament; an economic entity, 
namely the ECB and the counseling entity, which is the European Commission and 
Council. Arab countries have been relying on the Arab league with its economic council, 
yet, these entities have not been able to enforce integration agreements with the absence 
of compensations policies that can balance the economic gains among member states. 
Most Arab countries are ruled by corrupted rent seeking leaders, who lack a vision of 
integration that weights the expected long-term political economic gains against short 
term economic losses or compensations (Galal and Hoekman, 2003). 
The EU, although all its current economic issues, provides several lessons to Arab 
countries in terms of integration, mainly in emphasizing the role of a regional leader that 
can motivate other member states towards the effective implementation of agreements’ 
conditions (Fawzy, 2003).Arab social movements will take years to reach the targeted 
results towards democracy and achieve institutional frameworks that respond to the need 
of people through developing welfare states. The EU serves as good model in the area of 
117 
 
social spending as a percentage of GDP, especially in the areas of education and 
healthcare (European Report, 1997).  
After reviewing Arab integration politics, in the third chapter of the thesis, the 
fourth chapter has provided an assessment of the structure of intra-Arab trade, on both 
intra-imports and intra-exports levels. Oil-exporting countries are suffering from a high 
dependence on oil as the largest contributor to their GDPs, where oil-exports represent an 
average of 85% of their total trade (WITS, 2015). The low contribution of non-oil exports 
is questioning the sustainability of the economic growth of these oil-exporting nations 
given the vulnerability of oil and the fact of scarcity of resources. On the development 
side also, oil sector is a capital intensive sector that employs limited number of labour, 
which are mainly foreign labour in the case of Gulf countries (Gulf research report, 
2014). Gulf countries are witnessing an increase in unemployment rates and the 
developmental state must interfere through developing other sectors that can create the 
needed jobs (World Bank database, 2015). 
There are four main lessons from this thesis. First, Arab integration, with all the 
existing economic and political obstacles, still has a potential that stems from the large 
Arab market size and diversity of economic resources. The GAFTA has been one of the 
most successful Arab integration attempts since it includes almost all Arab countries and 
was based on the rules of the Economic Unity agreement, which was signed in 1957. This 
agreement has listed 10 rules of intra-Arab integration listed in the second article of the 
agreement, mainly the unification if trade regulations, providing the needed infrastructure 
and the coordination of labor legislation to help the mobility of calibers among member 
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states (The Economic Unity Agreement, 2003). The GAFTA was able to increase intra-
trade in the period of 1997 till 2005, however, Arab intraregional trade remains very low 
when compared to other regional agreements (Saidi, 2003). 
Second, unless Arab countries develop their dynamic comparative advantages 
Arab countries integration will only result in trade diversion. Simulating a Pan-Arab trade 
agreement shows a negative aggregate trade impact since Pan-Arabism will create trade 
diversion. Scholars argue that trade diversion can have some benefits in case of countries 
that count on tariff revenues as a source of their national income. Arab states have to 
establish a solid industrial and agricultural based on competitive and comparative 
advantage per country. In fact, Arab states have a relative comparative advantage in some 
non-oil commodities. For example, Egypt and Jordan have a relative comparative 
advantage in food and chemicals; Morocco has a comparative advantage in food and 
agricultural commodities, and United Arab Emirates has been establishing a solid 
industrial base specialized in machinery and transportation equipment (WITS, 2015).  
Moreover, table 12, in chapter four, has listed some non-oil commodities that enjoy 
relatively high export growth rates, thus each Arab state has to identify a number of 
commodities that have a relative comparative advantage and start developing their 
competitiveness in a way that enable them to compete on a global level and benefit 
regional partners. Integration agreements should have a higher level of transparency in 
order to share a common vision that can help states to bear short-term losses as opposed 
to the targeted long-term gains, both economical and political. 
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Third, further integration agreements urges Arab states to develop the current 
supranational institutions or establish now economic, political and regional consulting 
supranational institutions that have ‘real’ authorities in managing and enforcing 
integration conditions. Without developmental states, integration agreements will provide 
no results but theoretical debates. Fourth, integration should not only consider absolute 
economic growth but also prioritize human development on top of the integration agenda 
since human development is the tool to sustainable economic development, where 
professional healthy labour capital can build and develop the needed solid industrial and 
agricultural base.  I would like to end this argument and my thesis with a quote from 
Fridell (2013), as he sets the needed conditions for real economic development, which 
will also apply to the conditions of future Arab integration agreements, where he 
emphasizes that “the state has been made to act differently in the past, under the right 
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S1 Algeria Qatar 
TotalNo9
5 6909.54 6909.54 0 
S1 Algeria Qatar Transp 6.613 6.613 0 





S1 Algeria Lebanon AgrRaw 166.698 166.74 0.042 
S1 Algeria Lebanon Chemical 1739.293 
1739.29
3 0 
S1 Algeria Lebanon Food 2356.417 
2357.18
5 0.768 
S1 Algeria Lebanon Fuels 0.284 0.284 0 
S1 Algeria Lebanon manuf 93104.72 
93104.7
3 0.007 
S1 Algeria Lebanon NonOil 95656.26 
95657.0
8 0.817 
S1 Algeria Lebanon OresMtls 28.426 28.426 0 





S1 Algeria Lebanon PetrlPrd 0.284 0.284 0 
S1 Algeria Lebanon Textiles 1079.695 
1079.69
5 0 





S1 Algeria Lebanon Transp 45845.81 
45845.8
1 0.007 
S1 Algeria Libya 
Agricultu
re 25.572 25.572 0 
S1 Algeria Libya Chemical 354.229 354.229 0 
S1 Algeria Libya Food 25.572 25.572 0 
S1 Algeria Libya Fuels 0.39 0.39 0 
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S1 Algeria Libya manuf 761.953 761.953 0 
S1 Algeria Libya NonOil 787.525 787.525 0 
S1 Algeria Libya 
OthrMan
f 387.538 387.538 0 
S1 Algeria Libya PetrlPrd 0.39 0.39 0 
S1 Algeria Libya Textiles 9.554 9.554 0 
S1 Algeria Libya 
TotalNo9
5 787.915 787.915 0 
S1 Algeria Libya Transp 20.186 20.186 0 





S1 Algeria Saudi Arabia AgrRaw 40.902 40.902 0 
S1 Algeria Saudi Arabia Chemical 113315.8 
113319.
4 3.565 
S1 Algeria Saudi Arabia Food 5780.531 
5780.53
1 0 
S1 Algeria Saudi Arabia Fuels 2752.814 
2754.03
9 1.225 
S1 Algeria Saudi Arabia manuf 159647.2 
159651.
5 4.258 
S1 Algeria Saudi Arabia NonOil 166510 
166514.
3 4.267 
S1 Algeria Saudi Arabia OresMtls 1041.372 
1041.38
1 0.009 
S1 Algeria Saudi Arabia 
OthrMan
f 35558.62 35559.3 0.678 
S1 Algeria Saudi Arabia PetrlPrd 2733.863 
2735.08
8 1.225 
S1 Algeria Saudi Arabia Textiles 5917.814 
5917.81
4 0 





S1 Algeria Saudi Arabia Transp 10772.76 
10772.7
8 0.015 





S1 Algeria Jordan AgrRaw 14.241 14.253 0.012 
S1 Algeria Jordan Chemical 101643.7 
101643.
7 -0.011 
S1 Algeria Jordan Food 6946.834 
6946.83
4 0 
S1 Algeria Jordan Fuels 0.172 0.172 0 





S1 Algeria Jordan NonOil 123859.2 
123859.
3 0.144 
S1 Algeria Jordan OresMtls 827.606 827.606 0 





S1 Algeria Jordan PetrlPrd 0.172 0.172 0 
S1 Algeria Jordan Textiles 1690.775 
1690.77
5 0 





S1 Algeria Jordan Transp 3751.2 
3751.34
3 0.143 





S1 Algeria Morocco AgrRaw 245.322 245.322 0 
S1 Algeria Morocco Chemical 39976.1 
39976.1
5 0.05 
S1 Algeria Morocco Food 20336.36 
20336.5
5 0.191 
S1 Algeria Morocco Fuels 2971.526 
2971.52
6 0 
S1 Algeria Morocco manuf 92282.4 
92282.5
1 0.104 
S1 Algeria Morocco NonOil 120194.1 
120194.
5 0.361 
S1 Algeria Morocco OresMtls 7330.065 
7330.13
1 0.066 





S1 Algeria Morocco PetrlPrd 2971.526 
2971.52
6 0 
S1 Algeria Morocco Textiles 3399.73 3399.73 0 
S1 Algeria Morocco 
TotalNo9
5 123165.7 123166 0.361 












Emirates AgrRaw 39.613 39.613 0 
S1 Algeria 
United Arab 
Emirates Chemical 13318.39 13319.4 1.011 
S1 Algeria 
United Arab 



















































Emirates Transp 24831.37 
24832.5
5 1.186 
S1 Algeria Oman 
Agricultu
re 785.246 785.246 0 
S1 Algeria Oman Chemical 2431.308 
2431.30
8 0 
S1 Algeria Oman Food 785.246 785.246 0 
S1 Algeria Oman manuf 3810.759 
3810.75
9 0 
S1 Algeria Oman NonOil 4596.005 
4596.00
5 0 
S1 Algeria Oman 
OthrMan
f 806.904 806.904 0 






























Republic Fuels 3503.587 3504.11 0.524 
S1 Algeria 
Syrian Arab 
Republic manuf 45702.79 
45702.8
8 0.09 

































Republic Transp 8420.133 
8420.14
2 0.009 
S1 Algeria Yemen 
Agricultu
re 452.641 452.641 0 
S1 Algeria Yemen AgrRaw 11.498 11.498 0 
S1 Algeria Yemen Food 441.143 441.143 0 
S1 Algeria Yemen manuf 18.188 18.188 0 
S1 Algeria Yemen NonOil 470.829 470.829 0 
S1 Algeria Yemen 
OthrMan
f 0.907 0.907 0 
S1 Algeria Yemen 
TotalNo9
5 470.829 470.829 0 
S1 Algeria Yemen Transp 17.281 17.281 0 





S1 Algeria Egypt, Arab Rep. AgrRaw 743.217 743.226 0.009 
S1 Algeria Egypt, Arab Rep. Chemical 43070.67 
43076.2
4 5.574 
S1 Algeria Egypt, Arab Rep. Food 62218.64 
62218.6
4 0 
S1 Algeria Egypt, Arab Rep. Fuels 22829.17 
22829.1
8 0.011 
S1 Algeria Egypt, Arab Rep. manuf 402941.1 
402947.
2 6.141 
S1 Algeria Egypt, Arab Rep. NonOil 480064.2 
480070.
4 6.15 
S1 Algeria Egypt, Arab Rep. OresMtls 14161.29 
14161.2
9 0 





S1 Algeria Egypt, Arab Rep. PetrlPrd 3494.941 
3494.95
2 0.011 









S1 Algeria Egypt, Arab Rep. Transp 78645.32 
78645.4
9 0.173 























-0.311   0 -0.311 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 





-0.037   0 -0.037 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 
Lebanon Food -0.311   0 -0.311 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 
Lebanon Fuels 0   0 0 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 
Lebanon manuf -0.292   0 -0.292 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 










-0.13   0 -0.13 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 





-0.607   0 -0.607 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 















0   0 0 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 
Libya Food -0.011   0 -0.011 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 
Libya Fuels -0.014   0 -0.014 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 
Libya manuf -0.066   0 -0.066 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 










-0.062   0 -0.062 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 





-0.09   0 -0.09 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 





0   0 0 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 





0   0 0 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 
Algeria Food 0   0 0 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 
Algeria Fuels -0.048   0 -0.048 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 
Algeria manuf -0.003   0 -0.003 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 




















-0.051   0 -0.051 








-0.001   0 -0.001 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 





0   0 0 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 
Bahrain Food -0.001   0 -0.001 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 
Bahrain Fuels -0.002   0 -0.002 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 
Bahrain manuf -0.127   0 -0.127 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 
Bahrain Miscl 0   0 0 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 










-0.025   0 -0.025 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 





-0.175   0 -0.175 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 





0   0 0 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 





-0.001   0 -0.001 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 
Iraq Food 0   0 0 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 
Iraq manuf -0.005   0 -0.005 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 





-0.002   0 -0.002 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 















-0.063   0 -0.063 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 





-0.02   0 -0.02 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 
Jordan Food -0.053   0 -0.053 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 





-0.005   0 -0.005 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 





-0.007   0 -0.007 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 
Kuwait Food -0.005   0 -0.005 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 
Kuwait Fuels -0.029   0 -0.029 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 
Kuwait manuf -0.077   0 -0.077 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 
Kuwait Miscl 0   0 0 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 















-0.029   0 -0.029 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 





-0.111   0 -0.111 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 





0   0 0 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 
Qatar AgrRaw 0   0 0 
Egypt, Qatar Chemic 0   0 0 
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Arab Rep. al 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 
Qatar Food 0   0 0 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 
Qatar manuf -0.02   0 -0.02 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 
Qatar Miscl 0   0 0 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 










-0.014   0 -0.014 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 





-0.02   0 -0.02 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 





-0.92   0 -0.92 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 





0   0 0 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 
Morocco Food -0.92   0 -0.92 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 
Morocco manuf -1.256   0 -1.256 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 










-0.023   0 -0.023 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 





-2.178   0 -2.178 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 





-0.043   0 -0.043 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 







-0.026   0 -0.026 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 
Oman Food -0.043   0 -0.043 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 
Oman Fuels -0.014   0 -0.014 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 
Oman manuf -0.062   0 -0.062 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 















-0.014   0 -0.014 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 





-0.123   0 -0.123 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 
Oman Transp -0.02   0 -0.02 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 
Jordan manuf -0.44   0 -0.44 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 










-0.24   0 -0.24 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 





-0.504   0 -0.504 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 





-0.226   0 -0.226 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 





-0.356   0 -0.356 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 
Saudi Arabia Food -0.225   0 -0.225 






Saudi Arabia manuf -3.076   0 -3.076 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 
Saudi Arabia Miscl 0   0 0 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 















-0.354   0 -0.354 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 





-3.721   0 -3.721 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 




















































































-0.01   0 -0.01 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 





0   0 0 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 
Yemen Food -0.01   0 -0.01 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 
Yemen Fuels -0.034   0 -0.034 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 
Yemen manuf -0.005   0 -0.005 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 















-0.034   0 -0.034 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 





-0.048   0 -0.048 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 



















































-0.045   0 -0.045 
Egypt, United Arab OthrMa -1.095   0 -1.095 
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-0.017   0 -0.017 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 





-0.008   0 -0.008 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 
Tunisia Food -0.017   0 -0.017 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 
Tunisia Fuels 0   0 0 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 
Tunisia manuf -0.077   0 -0.077 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 















0   0 0 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 





-0.094   0 -0.094 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 
Tunisia Transp -0.005   0 -0.005 
 






re in 1000 
USD 
ExportsAft
er in 1000 
USD 
ExportChangeInReve
nue in 1000 USD 
Saudi Arabia Algeria Agriculture 3394.956 3394.956 0 
Saudi Arabia Algeria AgrRaw 1859.092 1859.092 0 
Saudi Arabia Algeria Chemical 166.148 166.148 0 
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Saudi Arabia Algeria Food 1535.864 1535.864 0 
Saudi Arabia Algeria manuf 1998.571 1998.571 0 
Saudi Arabia Algeria NonOil 5393.527 5393.527 0 
Saudi Arabia Algeria OthrManf 1832.423 1832.423 0 
Saudi Arabia Algeria TotalNo95 5393.527 5393.527 0 
Saudi Arabia Bahrain Agriculture 138146.4 138146.4 0 
Saudi Arabia Bahrain Chemical 30986.11 30986.11 0 
Saudi Arabia Bahrain Food 138146.4 138146.4 0 
Saudi Arabia Bahrain manuf 383384.4 383384.4 0 
Saudi Arabia Bahrain NonOil 805872.7 805872.7 0 
Saudi Arabia Bahrain OresMtls 284341.8 284341.8 0 
Saudi Arabia Bahrain OthrManf 292684.9 292684.9 0 
Saudi Arabia Bahrain TotalNo95 805872.7 805872.7 0 
Saudi Arabia Bahrain Transp 59713.35 59713.35 0 
Saudi Arabia 
Egypt, Arab 
Rep. Agriculture 387555.7 387555.7 0 
Saudi Arabia 
Egypt, Arab 
Rep. Food 387555.7 387555.7 0 
Saudi Arabia 
Egypt, Arab 
Rep. manuf 312184.2 312184.2 0 
Saudi Arabia 
Egypt, Arab 
Rep. NonOil 773700.3 773700.3 0 
Saudi Arabia 
Egypt, Arab 
Rep. OresMtls 73960.43 73960.43 0 
Saudi Arabia 
Egypt, Arab 
Rep. OthrManf 192488.1 192488.1 0 
Saudi Arabia 
Egypt, Arab 
Rep. TotalNo95 773700.3 773700.3 0 
Saudi Arabia 
Egypt, Arab 
Rep. Transp 119696.1 119696.1 0 
Saudi Arabia Jordan Agriculture 17352.41 17352.41 0 
Saudi Arabia Jordan Chemical 205462.3 205462.3 0 
Saudi Arabia Jordan Food 17352.41 17352.41 0 
Saudi Arabia Jordan manuf 326246.5 326246.5 0 
Saudi Arabia Jordan NonOil 343598.9 343598.9 0 
Saudi Arabia Jordan OthrManf 45673.49 45673.49 0 
Saudi Arabia Jordan TotalNo95 343598.9 343598.9 0 
Saudi Arabia Jordan Transp 75110.67 75110.67 0 
Saudi Arabia Kuwait Agriculture 42990.6 42990.6 0 
Saudi Arabia Kuwait Chemical 35885.46 35885.46 0 
Saudi Arabia Kuwait Food 42990.6 42990.6 0 
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Saudi Arabia Kuwait manuf 118040.7 118040.7 0 
Saudi Arabia Kuwait Miscl 3837.927 3837.927 0 
Saudi Arabia Kuwait NonOil 168518.6 168518.6 0 
Saudi Arabia Kuwait OresMtls 3649.378 3649.378 0 
Saudi Arabia Kuwait OthrManf 77297.25 77297.25 0 
Saudi Arabia Kuwait TotalNo95 168518.6 168518.6 0 
Saudi Arabia Kuwait Transp 4858.014 4858.014 0 
Saudi Arabia Lebanon Agriculture 28151.47 28151.47 0 
Saudi Arabia Lebanon Chemical 3543.235 3543.235 0 
Saudi Arabia Lebanon Food 28151.47 28151.47 0 
Saudi Arabia Lebanon manuf 107866 107866 0 
Saudi Arabia Lebanon NonOil 136017.5 136017.5 0 
Saudi Arabia Lebanon OthrManf 53612.3 53612.3 0 
Saudi Arabia Lebanon TotalNo95 136017.5 136017.5 0 
Saudi Arabia Lebanon Transp 50710.45 50710.45 0 
Saudi Arabia Libya Agriculture 1025.154 1025.154 0 
Saudi Arabia Libya AgrRaw 492.042 492.042 0 
Saudi Arabia Libya Food 533.112 533.112 0 
Saudi Arabia Libya NonOil 1025.154 1025.154 0 
Saudi Arabia Libya TotalNo95 1025.154 1025.154 0 
Saudi Arabia Morocco Agriculture 20218.79 20218.79 0 
Saudi Arabia Morocco Chemical 10822.52 10822.52 0 
Saudi Arabia Morocco Food 20218.79 20218.79 0 
Saudi Arabia Morocco manuf 15426.92 15426.92 0 
Saudi Arabia Morocco NonOil 37205.57 37205.57 0 
Saudi Arabia Morocco OresMtls 1559.866 1559.866 0 
Saudi Arabia Morocco OthrManf 4604.393 4604.393 0 
Saudi Arabia Morocco Textiles 4604.393 4604.393 0 
Saudi Arabia Morocco TotalNo95 37205.57 37205.57 0 
Saudi Arabia Oman Agriculture 161666 161666 0 
Saudi Arabia Oman Chemical 32623.58 32623.58 0 
Saudi Arabia Oman Food 161666 161666 0 
Saudi Arabia Oman manuf 127258 127258 0 
Saudi Arabia Oman NonOil 288924.1 288924.1 0 
Saudi Arabia Oman OthrManf 44154.43 44154.43 0 
Saudi Arabia Oman TotalNo95 288924.1 288924.1 0 
Saudi Arabia Oman Transp 50480.04 50480.04 0 
Saudi Arabia Qatar Agriculture 4225.427 4225.427 0 
Saudi Arabia Qatar Chemical 60777.98 60777.98 0 
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Saudi Arabia Qatar Food 4225.427 4225.427 0 
Saudi Arabia Qatar manuf 159191.7 159191.7 0 
Saudi Arabia Qatar Miscl 3594.706 3594.706 0 
Saudi Arabia Qatar NonOil 169049.6 169049.6 0 
Saudi Arabia Qatar OresMtls 2037.774 2037.774 0 
Saudi Arabia Qatar OthrManf 94123.22 94123.22 0 
Saudi Arabia Qatar TotalNo95 169049.6 169049.6 0 
Saudi Arabia Qatar Transp 4290.498 4290.498 0 
Saudi Arabia 
Syrian Arab 
Republic Agriculture 189629 189629 0 
Saudi Arabia 
Syrian Arab 
Republic Chemical 22317.37 22317.37 0 
Saudi Arabia 
Syrian Arab 
Republic Food 189629 189629 0 
Saudi Arabia 
Syrian Arab 
Republic manuf 62645.87 62645.87 0 
Saudi Arabia 
Syrian Arab 
Republic NonOil 252274.8 252274.8 0 
Saudi Arabia 
Syrian Arab 
Republic OthrManf 36683.39 36683.39 0 
Saudi Arabia 
Syrian Arab 
Republic Textiles 20722.03 20722.03 0 
Saudi Arabia 
Syrian Arab 
Republic TotalNo95 252274.8 252274.8 0 
Saudi Arabia 
Syrian Arab 
Republic Transp 3645.111 3645.111 0 
Saudi Arabia Tunisia Agriculture 9665.356 9665.356 0 
Saudi Arabia Tunisia Chemical 10673.71 10673.71 0 
Saudi Arabia Tunisia Food 9665.356 9665.356 0 
Saudi Arabia Tunisia manuf 22148.29 22148.29 0 
Saudi Arabia Tunisia NonOil 34007.16 34007.16 0 
Saudi Arabia Tunisia OresMtls 2193.52 2193.52 0 
Saudi Arabia Tunisia OthrManf 2200.988 2200.988 0 
Saudi Arabia Tunisia Textiles 1182.234 1182.234 0 
Saudi Arabia Tunisia TotalNo95 34007.16 34007.16 0 
Saudi Arabia Tunisia Transp 9273.59 9273.59 0 
Saudi Arabia 
United Arab 
Emirates Agriculture 543929.8 543929.8 0 
Saudi Arabia 
United Arab 
Emirates Chemical 247465.1 247465.1 0 
Saudi Arabia 
United Arab 





Emirates manuf 463872.1 463872.1 0 
Saudi Arabia 
United Arab 
Emirates NonOil 1114610 1114610 0 
Saudi Arabia 
United Arab 
Emirates OresMtls 106808.3 106808.3 0 
Saudi Arabia 
United Arab 
Emirates OthrManf 152061.2 152061.2 0 
Saudi Arabia 
United Arab 
Emirates TotalNo95 1114610 1114610 0 
Saudi Arabia 
United Arab 
Emirates Transp 64345.75 64345.75 0 
Saudi Arabia Yemen Agriculture 169209.6 169209.6 0 
Saudi Arabia Yemen AgrRaw 4163.021 4163.021 0 
Saudi Arabia Yemen Food 165046.6 165046.6 0 
Saudi Arabia Yemen manuf 2591.421 2591.421 0 
Saudi Arabia Yemen NonOil 171801 171801 0 
Saudi Arabia Yemen OthrManf 2591.421 2591.421 0 






























in 1000 USD 




-0.396 8.383 -8.779 
Morocco Egypt, Arab 
Rep. 
AgrRaw 0.098 0.124 -0.026 




-0.458 0.185 -0.644 
Morocco Egypt, Arab 
Rep. 
Food -0.495 8.259 -8.754 
Morocco Egypt, Arab 
Rep. 
Fuels -0.113 0 -0.113 
Morocco Egypt, Arab 
Rep. 
manuf -9.399 2.442 -11.841 
Morocco Egypt, Arab 
Rep. 
NonOil -10.069 10.825 -20.894 




-0.274 0 -0.274 




-9.161 0.187 -9.348 
Morocco Egypt, Arab 
Rep. 
PetrlPrd -0.109 0 -0.109 
Morocco Egypt, Arab 
Rep. 
Textiles -0.907 0.074 -0.981 




-10.154 10.825 -20.979 
Morocco Egypt, Arab 
Rep. 
Transp 0.22 2.07 -1.85 
Morocco Iraq Agricult
ure 
7.735 3.825 3.91 
Morocco Iraq Food 7.735 3.825 3.91 
Morocco Iraq Fuels -3.578 0 -3.578 
Morocco Iraq NonOil 7.735 3.825 3.91 
Morocco Iraq TotalNo
95 
4.157 3.825 0.332 
Morocco Algeria Agricult
ure 
0.638 0.425 0.213 
Morocco Algeria Chemica
l 
-0.046 0 -0.046 
Morocco Algeria Food 0.638 0.425 0.213 
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Morocco Algeria Fuels -1.189 0 -1.189 
Morocco Algeria manuf -0.155 0 -0.155 
Morocco Algeria NonOil 0.483 0.425 0.058 
Morocco Algeria OresMtl
s 
0 0 0 
Morocco Algeria OthrMa
nf 
-0.107 0 -0.107 
Morocco Algeria PetrlPrd -0.556 0 -0.556 
Morocco Algeria Textiles 0 0 0 
Morocco Algeria TotalNo
95 
-0.706 0.425 -1.131 
Morocco Algeria Transp -0.002 0 -0.002 
Morocco Bahrain Agricult
ure 
0 0 0 
Morocco Bahrain Chemica
l 
0 0 0 
Morocco Bahrain Food 0 0 0 
Morocco Bahrain manuf -0.01 0 -0.01 
Morocco Bahrain NonOil -0.026 0 -0.026 
Morocco Bahrain OresMtl
s 
-0.015 0 -0.015 
Morocco Bahrain OthrMa
nf 
-0.01 0 -0.01 
Morocco Bahrain Textiles -0.002 0 -0.002 
Morocco Bahrain TotalNo
95 
-0.026 0 -0.026 
Morocco Bahrain Transp 0 0 0 
Morocco Oman Agricult
ure 
-0.042 0.002 -0.044 
Morocco Oman Chemica
l 
0.166 0.113 0.053 
Morocco Oman Food -0.042 0.002 -0.044 
Morocco Oman manuf 0.119 0.113 0.006 
Morocco Oman NonOil 0.076 0.115 -0.038 
Morocco Oman OthrMa
nf 
-0.045 0 -0.045 
Morocco Oman Textiles 0 0 0 
Morocco Oman TotalNo
95 
0.076 0.115 -0.038 
Morocco Oman Transp -0.002 0 -0.002 
Morocco Saudi Arabia Agricult
ure 
-0.095 0.024 -0.119 
Morocco Saudi Arabia AgrRaw -0.028 0 -0.028 
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Morocco Saudi Arabia Chemica
l 
-1.995 0.008 -2.003 
Morocco Saudi Arabia Food -0.067 0.024 -0.091 
Morocco Saudi Arabia Fuels -6.032 0 -6.032 
Morocco Saudi Arabia manuf -4.437 0.271 -4.709 
Morocco Saudi Arabia NonOil -4.56 0.295 -4.855 
Morocco Saudi Arabia OresMtl
s 
-0.028 0 -0.028 
Morocco Saudi Arabia OthrMa
nf 
-2.304 0.264 -2.568 
Morocco Saudi Arabia PetrlPrd -0.161 0 -0.161 
Morocco Saudi Arabia Textiles -0.068 0.088 -0.156 
Morocco Saudi Arabia TotalNo
95 
-10.592 0.295 -10.887 
Morocco Saudi Arabia Transp -0.138 0 -0.138 




-0.099 0.004 -0.103 
Morocco Syrian Arab 
Republic 
AgrRaw -0.005 0 -0.005 




-0.244 0.011 -0.255 
Morocco Syrian Arab 
Republic 
Food -0.094 0.004 -0.098 
Morocco Syrian Arab 
Republic 
Fuels 0 0 0 
Morocco Syrian Arab 
Republic 
manuf -1.128 0.024 -1.152 
Morocco Syrian Arab 
Republic 
NonOil -1.235 0.028 -1.263 




-0.008 0 -0.008 




-0.877 0.012 -0.89 
Morocco Syrian Arab 
Republic 
PetrlPrd 0 0 0 
Morocco Syrian Arab 
Republic 
Textiles -0.171 0 -0.171 




-1.235 0.028 -1.263 
Morocco Syrian Arab 
Republic 
Transp -0.007 0 -0.007 
Morocco Tunisia Agricult
ure 
-15.366 2.085 -17.451 





-0.539 0.003 -0.542 
Morocco Tunisia Food -15.379 2.049 -17.428 
Morocco Tunisia Fuels 0 0 0 
Morocco Tunisia manuf -5.115 0.341 -5.456 
Morocco Tunisia NonOil -20.546 2.426 -22.972 
Morocco Tunisia OresMtl
s 
-0.065 0 -0.065 
Morocco Tunisia OthrMa
nf 
-3.711 0.018 -3.729 
Morocco Tunisia PetrlPrd 0 0 0 
Morocco Tunisia Textiles -0.846 0.003 -0.848 
Morocco Tunisia TotalNo
95 
-20.544 2.426 -22.97 
Morocco Tunisia Transp -0.865 0.319 -1.185 
Morocco Kuwait Chemica
l 
-0.106 0 -0.106 
Morocco Kuwait Fuels -0.49 0 -0.49 
Morocco Kuwait manuf -0.119 0 -0.119 
Morocco Kuwait NonOil -0.121 0 -0.121 
Morocco Kuwait OresMtl
s 
-0.002 0 -0.002 
Morocco Kuwait OthrMa
nf 
-0.013 0 -0.013 
Morocco Kuwait PetrlPrd -0.49 0 -0.49 
Morocco Kuwait Textiles 0 0 0 
Morocco Kuwait TotalNo
95 
-0.611 0 -0.611 
Morocco Kuwait Transp 0 0 0 
Morocco Lebanon Agricult
ure 
-0.228 0.011 -0.239 
Morocco Lebanon AgrRaw -0.058 0.003 -0.062 
Morocco Lebanon Chemica
l 
0.12 0.098 0.022 
Morocco Lebanon Food -0.169 0.007 -0.177 
Morocco Lebanon Fuels 0 0 0 
Morocco Lebanon manuf -0.531 0.103 -0.634 
Morocco Lebanon NonOil -0.76 0.113 -0.874 
Morocco Lebanon OresMtl
s 
-0.001 0 -0.001 
Morocco Lebanon OthrMa
nf 
-0.574 0.004 -0.578 
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Morocco Lebanon PetrlPrd 0 0 0 
Morocco Lebanon Textiles -0.001 0 -0.001 
Morocco Lebanon TotalNo
95 
-0.76 0.113 -0.874 
Morocco Lebanon Transp -0.077 0 -0.078 
Morocco Libya Chemica
l 
-0.015 0 -0.015 
Morocco Libya Fuels -0.003 0 -0.003 
Morocco Libya manuf -0.107 0 -0.107 
Morocco Libya NonOil -0.107 0 -0.107 
Morocco Libya OthrMa
nf 
-0.055 0 -0.055 
Morocco Libya PetrlPrd -0.003 0 -0.003 
Morocco Libya TotalNo
95 
-0.11 0 -0.11 
Morocco Libya Transp -0.037 0 -0.037 
Morocco Qatar Chemica
l 
-0.378 0 -0.378 
Morocco Qatar Fuels -0.001 0 -0.001 
Morocco Qatar manuf -0.411 0 -0.411 
Morocco Qatar NonOil -0.411 0 -0.411 
Morocco Qatar OthrMa
nf 
-0.033 0 -0.033 
Morocco Qatar PetrlPrd -0.001 0 -0.001 
Morocco Qatar Textiles -0.003 0 -0.003 
Morocco Qatar TotalNo
95 
-0.413 0 -0.413 
Morocco Qatar Transp 0 0 0 




2.691 3.747 -1.056 
Morocco United Arab 
Emirates 
AgrRaw -0.005 0 -0.005 




-0.148 0.246 -0.394 
Morocco United Arab 
Emirates 
Food 2.696 3.747 -1.051 
Morocco United Arab 
Emirates 
Fuels -0.06 0 -0.06 
Morocco United Arab 
Emirates 
manuf -4.717 0.503 -5.22 
Morocco United Arab 
Emirates 
NonOil -2.103 4.25 -6.352 








-4.295 0.255 -4.55 
Morocco United Arab 
Emirates 
PetrlPrd -0.06 0 -0.06 
Morocco United Arab 
Emirates 
Textiles -0.397 0.137 -0.534 




-2.158 4.25 -6.407 
Morocco United Arab 
Emirates 
Transp -0.274 0.001 -0.276 
Morocco Jordan Agricult
ure 
0.575 0.336 0.24 
Morocco Jordan Chemica
l 
-0.008 0.001 -0.009 
Morocco Jordan Food 0.575 0.336 0.24 
Morocco Jordan manuf -0.137 0.296 -0.433 
Morocco Jordan NonOil 0.427 0.632 -0.205 
Morocco Jordan OresMtl
s 
-0.012 0 -0.012 
Morocco Jordan OthrMa
nf 
-0.118 0.002 -0.12 
Morocco Jordan Textiles -0.045 0 -0.046 
Morocco Jordan TotalNo
95 
0.427 0.632 -0.205 
Morocco Jordan Transp -0.011 0.293 -0.304 
Morocco Yemen Agricult
ure 
-0.001 0 -0.001 
Morocco Yemen Food -0.001 0 -0.001 
Morocco Yemen manuf 0 0 0 
Morocco Yemen NonOil -0.001 0 -0.001 
Morocco Yemen OthrMa
nf 
0 0 0 
Morocco Yemen Textiles 0 0 0 
Morocco Yemen TotalNo
95 
-0.001 0 -0.001 
 
